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1.	 Introduction
According	to	a	conventional	economic	view,	countries	which	posses	rich	natural	resource	endowments	
are	considered	fortunate.	This	view	is	supported	by	neo-classic	economic	theory	which	states	that	coun-
tries	are	best	off	producing	whatever	is	their	comparative	advantage,	whether	that	is	natural	resources	or	
manufacturing.	The	early	development	literature	assumes	that	natural	resource	wealth	would	support	
countries	to	grow	(Viner,	1952;	Lewis,	1955;	Rostow,	1960;	Lewis,	1989).	Natural	resources	are	regarded	
as	part	of	a	country’s	natural	capital1,	along	with	agricultural	land,	forests,	and	other	natural	resources,	
which	could	be	converted	(via	extraction)	into	an	output	to	be	consumed	or	into	another	form	of	capital	
that	directly	contributes	to	economic	development	(Davis/	Tilton,	2005:	235;	Bornhorst	et	al.,	2009:	
439).	This	conversion	process,	and	the	technologies	that	it	entails,	can	also	spur	knowledge	gains	that	
benefit	the	efficiency	of	conventional	capital	as	well	(De	Ferranti	et	al.,	2002;	Wright/	Czelusta,	2004).
Based	on	this	conventional	view,	various	strands	of	development	economics	saw	natural	resources	(and	
the	income	they	generate)	as	a	means	to	cope	with	and	overcome	low	levels	of	investment	(Lewis,	1955;	
Rostow,	1960)	as	well	as	capital	and	foreign	exchange	constraints	(Joshi,	1970;	El	Shibley/	Thirwall,	
1981)	that	were	considered	to	hinder	development.	Natural	resource	extraction	was	considered	the	‘big	
push’	to	break	out	of	a	self-feeding	circle	of	poverty	(cf.	e.g.,	Murphy	et	al.,	1989)	and	to	make	the	tran-
sition	from	underdevelopment	to	industrial	‘take-off’,	just	as	they	had	done	for	countries	such	as	Aus-
tralia,	the	United	States,	and	Britain	(Rostow,	1960;	see	also	Drake,	1972;	Krueger,	1980).
Critical	voices,	such	as	Singer	(1950)	and	Prebisch	(1950),	remained	a	minority;	they	argued	that	the	
structure	of	the	global	economy	and	the	nature	of	international	commodity	markets	would	put	devel-
oping	countries	relying	on	natural	resource	exports	at	a	serious	disadvantage.
However,	since	the	late	1980s	empirical	studies	have	shown	the	opposite	(for	reviews	of	the	extensive	
literature	see	Ross,	1999;	Stevens,	2003b;	Rosser,	2006;	Frankel,	2010).	A	large	number	of	studies	have	
suggested	that	natural	resource	abundance	increases	the	likelihood	that	countries	will	experience	neg-
ative	economic,	political	and	social	outcomes	including	poor	economic	performance,	increased	income	
inequality,	prevalence	of	poverty,	low	levels	of	democracy,	high	levels	of	corruption	and	higher	proba-
bility	of	civil	war	(Nankani,	1979;	Gelb	et	al.,	1988;	Fields,	1989;	Auty,	1993;	Collier/	Hoeffler,	1998;	
Leite/	Weidmann,	2002;	Wantchekon,	2002;	Ross,	1999,	2001a,	2001b,	2003a;	Sarraf/	Jiwanji,	2001;	
Eifert	et	al.,	2003;	Bannon/	Collier,	2003;	Sala-i-Martin/	Subramanian,	2003;	Davis	et	al.,	2003;	Isham	
et	al.,	2005).	This	literature	has	been	extremely	influential:	the	idea	that	natural	resources	are	bad	for	
development	is	now	widely	accepted.
In	this	context,	the	term	‘resource	curse’2	refers	to	the	paradox	that	countries	with	a	sizeable	endow-
ment	of	natural	resources	have	in	general	been	unsuccessful	in	translating	that	wealth	into	economic	
development,	social	prosperity	and	political	stability	or	democratization.	Numerous	studies	indicate	
that	they	tend	to	have	slower	economic	growth	and	worse	development	outcomes	than	countries	with	
fewer	natural	resources.	
However,	the	empirical	tests	so	far	have	been	inconclusive,	especially	when	one	generalizes	beyond	oil.	
Scholars	either	find	that	on	average	natural	resources	have	had	no	reliable	impact	on	development	or	that	
its	impacts	even	have	been	positive	(cf.	e.g.,	Delacroix,	1977;	Davis,	1995;	Sala-i-Martin,	1997;	Acemoglu	
et	al.,	2001;	De	Ferranti	et	al.,	2002;	Lederman/	Maloney,	2002;	Herb,	2005).	Most	recently,	Alexeev/	
1  Next to natural capital, there are other types of capital: Physical structures, including houses, roads, factories, hos-
pitals and railways, constitute man-made or physical capital. Education, safe public water and sanitary systems, 
as well as other investments in people, create human capital. Investments in scientific research and new technol-
ogies create knowledge capital. Finally, investments in the legal system and other forms of governance create in-
stitutional capital (Davis/ Tilton, 2005: 234). 
2  The term ‘resource curse’ was first used in the formal economics literature by Auty (1993). Karl (1997) coined the 
phrase ‘paradox of plenty’.
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Conrad	(2009)	find	that	oil	and	mineral	wealth	have	positive	effects	on	income	per	capita,	when	con-
trolling	for	a	number	of	variables.	They	consider	the	long-term	economic	growth	of	resource-rich	coun-
tries	on	balance	positive.	In	similar	vein,	Boyce/	Emery	(2010)	find	that	while	resource	abundance	is	
negatively	correlated	with	growth,	it	is	positively	correlated	with	income	levels.
Today,	it	is	generally	agreed	that	mineral	resources3	have	promoted	economic	development	in	several	
countries,	namely	Botswana	(Hill,	1991;	Love,	1994;	Hope,	1998;	Sarraf/	Jiwanji,	2001;	Acemoglu	et	
al.,	2003;	Iimi,	2006;	Pegg,	2010),	Chile	(Schurman,	1996;	Mikesell,	1997;	Hojman,	2002;	Fuentes,	
2010),	Indonesia	(Booth,	1995;	Usui,	1996,	1997),	Malaysia	(Shamsul,	1997;	Royan,	1999;	Rasiah/	
Shari,	2001)	and	Norway	(Wright/	Czelusta,	2007).	Historically,	Britain,	the	United	States	(Wright/	
Czelusta,	2007),	Germany,	the	Netherlands,	Australia,	Canada,	Sweden	and	Finland	(Blomström/	
Kokko,	2007)	are	often	cited	as	successful	examples	(Davis/	Tilton,	2005:	237).4
The	consensus	on	this	issue	is	important,	for	it	means	that	one	uniform	policy	toward	all	natural	resource	
extraction	in	the	developing	world	is	not	desirable	(Davis/	Tilton,	2005:	234).	Accordingly,	Auty	(1994a:	
12)	qualifies	that	the	relationship	between	natural	resource	wealth,	mediating	political	variables,	and	
development	outcomes	is	not	an	iron	law,	but	a	strong	recurrent	tendency	(see	also	Davis,	1995:	1765;	
Ross,	2001c:	8;	Frankel,	2010:	33).	Their	analyses	therefore	do	not	necessarily	preclude	the	possibility	of	
variation	in	the	value	of	mediating	variables	or	in	development	outcomes	(Auty/	Gelb,	2001;	Auty,	2001c).	
Because	some	mineral	rich	countries	have	succeeded	in	using	the	opportunities	the	natural	resource	
endowment	provided	them	with,	this	working	paper	argues	that	negative	consequences	of	a	resource	
boom	are	not	a	‘curse’	in	the	sense	of	an	unavoidable	fate	or	destiny,	but	rather	are	the	result	of	specific	
policy	choices.	Therefore,	it	seems	more	appropriate	to	speak	of	resource	challenges.	It	then	depends	on	
the	circumstances	and	the	political	and	economic	elites	of	specific	countries	whether	these	challenges	
are	mastered	or	not.	Accordingly,	these	resource	challenges	are	unbundled	in	the	following	section.
The	literature	on	the	impact	of	natural	resources	on	a	society/	economy	can	be	divided	into	four	sepa-
rate	sub-literatures	analysing	the	relationship	between	natural	resource	abundance	and	(1) economic	
performance,	(2) economic	policy,	(3) political	conflict	and	(4) socio-economic	development.	In	the	
following	these	possible	challenges	are	presented.
The	impact	of	a	resource	boom	on	macroeconomic	performance	has	been	studied	most	extensively	and	
is	probably	the	best	understood	resource	challenge.	It	relates	first	of	all	to	the	monetary	consequences	of	
a	huge	(and	often	volatile)	influx	of	foreign	currency	into	an	economy,	which	manifests	itself	first	of	all	
in	the	trade	balance,	in	an	appreciated	exchange	rate	and	in	an	increased	inflation	rate.	Here	the	major	
resource	challenge	is	to	sterilize	the	impact	of	the	influx	of	revenues.
However,	in	every	resource	boom	the	state	has	to	manage	the	resource	industry	and	the	financial	flows	
generated	by	the	boom.	The	major	resource	challenges	originating	from	this	task	are	the	definition	of	
ownership	rights	(concerning	resources	and	producing	companies),	the	development	of	a	sound	budget	
policy	and	the	development	of	an	industrial	policy	(either	to	ensure	sustainable	resource	production	or	
to	promote	growth	in	other	parts	of	the	economy).	As	the	fast	rise	in	state	budget	earnings	(or	even	the	
mere	prospect	of	increased	earnings)	produces	many	claims,	raises	expectations	and	arouses	covetous-
ness	among	the	populace	and	the	elites	alike,	another	challenge	in	this	context	is	the	containment	of	
rent-seeking	behaviour	and	corruption.
Covetousness	for	access	to	income	generated	by	the	resource	boom	are	often	not	limited	to	specific	
projects,	but	can	easily	transform	into	a	broader	struggle	over	access	to	rents	or	to	political	power	in	
general.	As	a	result	these	rising	expectations	and	demands	fuelled	by	a	resource	boom	can	lead	to	social	
3  Mineral resources normally incorporate both energy resources such as crude oil, natural gas, (hard and soft) coal 
as well as metals and minerals such as bauxite, copper, lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, gold, silver and iron ore.
4  However, Ross (2001a) and Power (2002), for example, question the relevance of the US, Canadian, and Austral-
ian experience in the 1900s for currently developing countries and assume that any past successes are unlikely to 
be repeated. 
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unrest,	to	power	struggles	within	the	elites	and	in	the	extreme	to	civil	war	over	control	of	the	resources.	
The	major	policy	challenge	in	this	context	would	be	the	guarantee	of	political	stability.	In	this	context	it	
is	often	argued	that	a	resource	boom	promotes	authoritarianism.	Guarantees	of	civil	rights	and	democ-
ratisation	could,	therefore,	also	be	interpreted	as	resource	challenges.
In	the	case	of	socioeconomic	challenges	the	resource	curse	literature	tries	to	explain	why	a	resource	
boom	(more	often	than	not)	has	no	positive	impact	on	socioeconomic	development,	i.e.	why	the	income	
generated	from	resource	production	does	not	translate	into	improved	social	welfare,	health	care	or	edu-
cation.	Here	the	major	resource	challenge	would	be	the	creation	and	implementation	of	a	sound	socio-
economic	development	policy.	
While	the	first	three	groups	of	resource	challenges	are	short-term	tasks	(though	they	have	long-term	
consequences),	the	promotion	of	socioeconomic	development	can	only	be	realised	in	the	long	term.

2.	 Challenges	for	Trade	and	Monetary	Policy
A	large	number	of	studies	have	presented	evidence	to	suggest	that	natural	resource	abundance,	or	at	least	
an	abundance	of	particular	natural	resources,	reduces	economic	growth	in	many	countries	over	extended	
periods	of	time	(cf.	e.g.,	Wheeler,	1984;	Gelb	et	al.,	1988;	Auty,	1990,	1993,	1994a,	1994b,	1998,	2001a,	
2001b;	Ranis,	1991;	Bulmer-Thomas,	1994;	Sachs/	Warner,	1995a,	1995b,	1997;	Lal/	Myint,	1996;	
Mikesell,	1997).	Growth	was	even	negative	for	a	number	of	countries,	causing	early	regional	dominance	
to	be	lost	over	time.	This	research	appeared	to	demonstrate	that	the	exploitation	of	mineral	wealth	was	
far	from	a	sufficient	condition	for	sustained	economic	development.	Wheeler	(1984),	for	instance,	found	
that	resource-rich	countries	in	sub-Saharan	Africa	grew	more	slowly	than	their	resource-poor	neigh-
bours	during	the	1970s.	Similarly,	Gelb	et	al.	(1988)	found	that	mineral	economies	experienced	a	more	
serious	deterioration	in	the	efficiency	of	domestic	capital	formation	during	the	boom	period	of	1971–
1983	than	non-mineral	economies,	leading	to	negative	growth	in	hard	mineral	economies	and	to	dra-
matically	reduced	growth	in	oil	exporting	economies	(see	also	Auty,	1993).	Beyond	low	levels	of	eco-
nomic	growth,	Nankani	(1979)	found	that	resource-abundant	economies	performed	relatively	poorly	
in	terms	of	agricultural	growth,	export	diversification5	and	inflation	compared	to	non-mineral	econo-
mies	and	they	were	more	likely	to	be	characterized	by	on	average	lower	savings	rates	(see	also	Atkinson/	
Hamilton,	2003),	greater	technological	and	wage	dualism,	high	unemployment,	high	foreign	debts	and	
high	export	earnings	instability.	
Of	particular	influence	was	a	study	by	Sachs/	Warner	(1995a)	examining	the	experiences	of	a	large	and	
diverse	set	of	natural	resource	economies	between	1970	and	1989.	Using	cross-section	samples,	the	
authors	found	that	a	greater	economic	dependence	on	oil	and	minerals	is	correlated	with	slower	eco-
nomic	growth	(see	also	Sachs/	Warner,	1995b,	1997,	1999a,	1999b,	2000).	Sachs/	Warner	(2001)	sum-
marized	and	extended	previous	research	showing	evidence	that	countries	with	great	natural	resource	
wealth	tend	to	grow	more	slowly	than	resource-poor	countries.	They	claim	their	result	 is	not	easily	
explained	by	other	variables,	or	by	alternative	ways	to	measure	resource	abundance.	Their	paper	found	
little	direct	evidence	that	omitted	geographical	or	climate	variables	might	explain	the	slow	growth,	or	
that	there	is	a	bias	in	the	estimates	resulting	from	some	other	unobserved	growth	deterrent.6
Gylfason	et	al.	(1999)	produced	similar	results,	also	using	large	datasets,	showing	that	per-capita-GDP	
shrunk	by	1.3%	per	year	for	OPEC	countries	from	1965	to	1998.	Mehlum	et	al.	(2006)	remark	that	
the	Asian	tigers	(Korea,	Taiwan,	Hong	Kong	and	Singapore)	are	all	resource-poor,	while	growth	los-
ers	(Nigeria,	Zambia,	Sierra	Leone,	Angola,	Saudi	Arabia,	and	Venezuela)	are	all	resource-rich.	For	the	
period	of	1960	to	1990,	Auty	(2001a)	found	that	per	capita	incomes	in	resource-poor	countries	grew	at	
significantly	higher	rates	than	in	resource-abundant	countries.	Neumayer	(2004)	also	discovered	a	neg-
ative	effect	on	economic	growth	if	one	measured	growth	in	terms	of	‘genuine	income’—that	is,	GDP	
minus	the	depreciation	of	produced	and	natural	capital—rather	than	GDP.	
Much	early	work	on	the	economic	performance	of	resource-abundant	countries	suggested	that	the	causal	
mechanisms	for	potential	the	negative	consequences	were	essentially	economic	in	nature	(Rosser,	2006:	
13).	While	this	aspect	has	been	mostly	studied	in	the	context	of	booms	in	mineral	commodities,	partic-
ularly	oil	and	gas,	the	causal	mechanisms,	however,	are	similar	for	all	commodities	(Asfaha,	2007:	7).7	
5  Wood/ Berge (1997) found that resource-abundant countries were less likely to export manufactured goods than 
resource-poor countries
6  Other studies that find a negative effect of natural resources (and of oil in particular) on economic performance 
include Ross (2001) and Sala-i-Martin/ Subramanian (2003).
7  ‘This is essentially due to two factors. First, oil and gas prices are more volatile than other commodities. Second, 
mineral commodities such as gas and oil in general generate higher income than primary agricultural commod-
ities, and are thus more alluring to rent-seeking behaviour. However, the difference in correlations of natural re-
source wealth and growth between mineral and non-mineral commodities is essentially one of degree’ (Asfaha, 
2007: 7).
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•	 Singer	(1950)	and	Prebisch	(1950)	argued	that	resource-abundant	countries	would	suffer	from	
declining	terms	of	trade	over	time,	resulting	in	constrained	prospects	for	economic	growth	and	
development.	
•	 Hirschman	(1958)	stressed	the	‘enclave’	nature	of	natural	resource	exploitation	and	that	the	nat-
ural	resource	sector	would	be	unlikely	to	stimulate	growth	in	the	rest	of	the	economy.
•	 Nurske	(1958)	and	Levin	(1960)	argued	that	international	commodity	markets	were	inherently	
unstable	and	that	any	instability	(i.e.,	unusually	sharp	price	fluctuations)	within	them	could	eas-
ily	be	transferred	to	resource-abundant	domestic	economies.	This,	in	turn,	would	affect	the	reli-
ability	of	government	revenues	and	foreign	exchange	supplies.	
•	 Corden/	Neary	(1982)	and	Bruno/	Sachs	(1982)	argued	that	resource-abundant	countries	were	
susceptible	to	the	so-called	‘Dutch	disease’;	a	resource	boom	would	lead	to	appreciation	of	the	real	
exchange	rate	and	in	turn	damages	manufacturing	and	other	non-resource	sectors	of	an	economy.
2.1.	 Terms	of	Trade/	Linkage	Effect
2.1.1.	 Terms	of	Trade
Singer	(1950)	and	Prebisch	(1950)	argue	that	exporters	of	primary	commodities	would	find	themselves	
disadvantaged	in	trading	with	industrialized	countries	due	to	deteriorating	terms	of	trade.	They	assume	
that	commodity	prices	follow	a	downward	trajectory	in	the	long-run,	relative	to	the	prices	of	manufac-
tures	and	other	products.	While	higher	competition	in	the	primary	commodity	markets	result	in	lower	
prices	(cost	reductions	are	passed	on	immediately	to	the	consumers),	producers	of	many	manufactured	
products	typically	enjoy	same	market	power	which	allows	them	to	divert	the	benefits	of	falling	costs	
to	workers	and	shareholders	(in	form	of	higher	salaries	and	dividends)	instead	of	consumers	(Davis/	
Tilton,	2005:	235;	Bornhorst	et	al.,	2009:	439).
For	Prebisch,	industrialization	is	the	key	to	economic	growth	(Davis,	1995:	1766).8	This	intuition	is	sup-
ported	by	Matsuyama	(1992);	in	his	model	the	manufacturing	sector	is	characterized	by	learning-by-
doing,	while	the	natural	resource	sector	(in	his	case	agriculture)	is	not.	Thus,	deliberate	policy-induced	
diversification	out	of	primary	commodities	into	manufacturing	is	justified	because	productivity	growth	
in	manufacturing	is	fastest	(Echevarria,	1997;	Wood/	Berge,	1997;	Auty/	Kiiski,	2001)	and	a	perma-
nent	commodity	boom	that	crowds	out	manufacturing	(see	‘Dutch	disease’)	would	be	harmful	for	an	
economy	(Frankel,	2010:	5,	12–13).9
Therefore,	diversification	out	of	primary	commodities	into	manufacturing	was	considered	desirable.	As	
a	countermeasure	to	deteriorating	terms	of	trade,	and	because	it	was	assumed	that	countries	can	only	
acquire	sustainable	wealth	through	industrialization,	the	government	was	supposed	to	implement	a	
special	industrial	policy	(i.e.,	import	substitution,	see	Section 3.2.1)	to	protect	domestic	manufactur-
ers	from	foreign	competition	with	the	aim	to	develop	a	competitive	domestic	industrial	base	(Davis/	
Tilton,	2005:	234).
8  This notion, however, was criticised by Bauer (1972) who saw the agricultural sector having a leading role in eco-
nomic growth in developing countries.
9  The assumption that no learning takes place in extraction of natural resources can be challenged. The theoreti-
cal models of this effect do not account for labour or capital employed in the extraction process (Sachs/ Warner, 
1995a, 1999); that would eliminate extraction as a manufacturing activity and by definition rule out learning 
from production. Contrary to these models, Davis/ Tilton (2005: 238) claim that the discovery, extraction, and 
processing of mineral commodities indeed entails sophisticated technologies resulting in learning effects. How-
ever, since the hydrocarbon and mineral sectors are typically capital- rather than labour-intensive they generally 
employ relatively few people. Additionally, learning effects might be further limited by the fact that multinational 
corporations usually bring in their own (highly specialized) workers (see Linkage Effects, Section 2.1.2).
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The	issue	of	declining	terms	of	trade	is	controversial	and	has	been	much	contested	on	both	empirical	
and	theoretical	grounds.10	Numerous	studies	have	both	attacked	and	defended	the	Prebisch-Singer	the-
sis	that	the	prices	of	primary	products	have	fallen	over	time	relative	to	the	prices	of	manufacturing	prod-
ucts	(see	Sapsford	1990	for	a	survey	of	the	older	literature).	
Some	of	the	more	recent	empirical	work	appears	to	support	the	existence	of	a	long-term	secular	decline	
in	primary	product	prices	(Powell,	1991;	Ardeni/	Wright,	1992;	Deaton/	Laroque,	1992;	Bleaney/	
Greenaway,	1993;	Sapsford/	Balasubramanyam,	1994;	Reinhart/	Wickham,	1994;	Bloch/	Sapsford,	
2000)	although	others	remain	uncertain	(Pindyck,	1999,	focusing	on	energy	prices).	Other	works	chal-
lenge	the	empirical	basis	of	the	argument	(Cuddington/	Urzua,	1989;	Mikesell,	1997;	De	Ferranti	et	al.,	
2002;	Hadass/	Williamson,	2003;	Kellard/	Wohar,	2006;	Balagtas/	Holt,	2009).
Studies	of	trends	in	international	commodity	prices	have	suggested	that	while	in	overall	terms	these	
prices	have	declined	during	the	twentieth	century11,	this	has	been	due	largely	to	price	declines	for	com-
modities	more	or	less	exclusively	exported	by	developed	countries	or	relatively	successful	developing	
countries.	Cuddington	(1992),	studying	the	single	commodities	separately,	found	that	prices	of	com-
modities	exported	primarily	by	other	developing	countries	have	not	declined	severely	during	this	period	
(see	also	Cuddington	et	al.,	2007).	
The	overall	statistical	trend	in	the	long	run	seems	to	depend,	more	than	anything	else,	on	the	date	of	
the	end	of	the	sample.	When	real	commodity	prices	undergo	large	ten-year	cycles	around	a	trend,	esti-
mates	of	the	trend	are	very	sensitive	to	the	precise	time	period	studied.	Thus,	one	must	take	a	longer-term	
perspective;	it	is	important	to	examine	as	long	a	statistical	time	series	as	possible	(Frankel,	2010:	8–9).
An	additional	problem	arises	because	many	manufactured	products	improve	in	quality	over	time.	So	
even	assuming	the	trend	in	the	ratio	of	prices	for	primary	to	manufactured	products	is	indeed	down-
ward,	this	may	simply	reflect	improvements	in	the	quality	of	the	manufactured	goods.	Removing	this	
bias,	however,	is	extremely	difficult,	particularly	over	many	decades	(Svedberg/	Tilton,	2003).
‘Nevertheless	it	is	difficult	to	see	why	a	slow	decline	in	prices	would	explain	the	sort	of	deterioration	in	
economic	performance	associated	with	‘resource	curse’.	Economies	constantly	face	changing	relative	
prices.	If	they	take	place	gradually,	economies	might	be	expected	to	adjust	unless	other	factors	are	at	
work’	(Davis/	Tilton,	2005:	237).
Perhaps	of	greater	importance,	even	if	the	true	terms	of	trade	are	declining,	is	that	the	relevance	of	this	
decline	for	developing	countries	is	not	clear.	For	instance,	the	real	price	of	copper	has	declined	over	
the	past	three	decades,	which	presumably	has	diminished	the	terms	of	trade	of	Chile,	the	world’s	larg-
est	copper	producer.	This	decline	has	come	about	largely	because	the	costs	of	producing	copper	around	
the	world	have	fallen	as	a	result	of	new	technology	and	other	developments.	The	wealth	or	economic	
rent	created	by	a	country’s	natural	resource	sector,	therefore,	depends	not	only	on	the	price	the	country	
receives	for	its	commodities	but	also	on	the	costs	of	production.	If	the	country’s	costs	have	fallen	faster	
than	the	commodity	price	the	benefits	of	natural	resource	extraction	for	the	country	may	actually	be	
rising	despite	the	downward	trend	in	the	price	of	the	specific	commodity	(Davis/	Tilton,	2005:	237).
In	summary,	the	Prebisch-Singer	hypothesis	of	a	negative	long-term	trend	in	commodity	prices	is	coun-
teracted	by	empirical	findings	that	there	is	no	consistent	trend	either	way	(Frankel,	2010:	33;	Davis,	
1995:	1767;	see	also	Cuddington	et	al.,	2007).	There	has	been	more	support	in	subsequent	studies	for	
the	argument	of	economic	linkages	(cf.	Auty,	1990;	Fosu,	1996).
10  Frankel (2010: 8) states that it is possible to generalize somewhat across commodity prices (although prices do 
not always move together, for oil, other minerals and agricultural products there is a high correlation).
11  Taking a long-term view, Frankel (2010: 8) shows that terms of trade for commodity producers had a slight up-
ward trend from 1870 to World War I, downward in the inter-war period, upward in the 1970s, downward in the 
1980s and 1990s, and upward in the first decade of the new century.
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2.1.2.	 Linkage	Effect
Advocating	the	development	of	a	competitive	domestic	industrial	base,	Hirschman	(1958),	Seers	(1964)	
and	Baldwin	(1966)	stress	the	limited	economic	linkages	from	primary	commodity	exports	for	an	econ-
omy.	They	argue	that	the	natural	resource	sectors	are	of	an	‘enclave’	nature	and	that	multinational	enter-
prises	in	these	sectors	tend	to	repatriate	profits	rather	than	reinvest	them	in	the	local	economy.	Needed	
supplies	are	imported	and	little	value	is	added	domestically,	as	primary	commodities	are	mostly	exported	
for	processing	abroad.	Additionally,	natural	resource	extraction	generates	little	employment	and	many	
of	the	workers	employed	(particularly	the	more	skilled	workers)	come	from	abroad.	As	a	result,	the	host	
country	gains	little	from	extractive	industries	besides	the	monetary	benefits	in	form	of	corporate	tax-
ation	and	royalties	(Davis/	Tilton,	2005:	236).	This	would	make	development	difficult	by	restricting	
opportunities	for	the	development	of	backward	and	forward	linkages	between	these	resource	extrac-
tion	activities	and	the	rest	of	the	economy.	Therefore,	the	natural	resource	sector	could	promote	growth	
only	to	a	limited	extent	compared	to	manufacturing.	Primary	commodities	create	only	limited	learn-
ing	effects	and	are	unlikely	to	stimulate	the	rest	of	the	economy.
The	argument	that	mining	is	typically	an	enclave	industry,	though	not	new,	is	also	far	from	settled.	Davis	
(1995:	1767)	claims	that	natural	resource	extraction	indeed	creates	a	linkage	effect	via	infrastructure,	
urban	development	etc.	Many	studies	of	mining	regions	show	that	wages	and	other	domestic	expendi-
tures	do	have	a	significant	multiplier	effect	on	the	local	economy	(Ahammad/	Clements,	1999;	Clements/	
Johnson,	2000;	Stilwell	et	al.,	2000;	Aroca,	2001).	Others	document	that	mining	in	many	cases	does	
in	fact	promote	important	downstream	and	upstream	linkages	(De	Ferranti	et	al.,	2002).	However,	for	
various	reasons,	these	studies	concentrate	primarily	on	the	developed	countries	and	the	more	advanced	
developing	countries	(Davis/	Tilton,	2005:	239).
Analysing	linkage	effects	in	23	oil-producing	developing	countries,	Klein	(2010)	shows	that	the	exter-
nalities	of	the	oil	sector	highly	depend	on	the	countries’	degree	of	oil-intensity.	While	in	low	oil-inten-
sity	economies,	the	incentives	to	strengthen	both	fiscal	and	private	sector	institutions	lead	to	positive	
inter-sectoral	externalities,	weaker	incentives	in	high	oil-intensity	economies	adversely	affect	fiscal	and	
private	sector	institutions	and	consequently	lead	to	negative	inter-sectoral	externalities.
However,	host	government	efforts	to	replace	foreign	employees	with	locals,	to	promote	downstream	
processing,	and	to	require	extracting	companies	to	acquire	supplies	from	domestic	firms	can	be	coun-
terproductive	by	increasing	the	costs	of	mining	and	so	reduce	the	monetary	rents	of	the	host	country.	
In	such	situations,	the	government	is	in	effect	subsidizing	linkage	activities.	‘While	a	desire	to	create	
domestic	employment	may	be	commendable,	there	are	far	more	labour-intensive	industries	than	min-
ing	or	mineral	processing.	Moreover,	economic	development	requires	the	creation	of	wealth.	Subsidiz-
ing	industries	that	would	otherwise	lose	money	destroys	wealth’	(Davis/	Tilton,	2005:	239).
Davis/	Tilton	(2005:	239)	challenge	the	enclave	argument	by	questioning	its	relevance:	even	if	a	coun-
try	benefits	mostly	in	the	form	of	monetary	inflows,	such	returns	can	support	education,	public	health,	
infrastructure	projects	and	other	investments	that	stimulate	development.	
2.2.	 Price/	Revenue	Volatility
While	the	argument	of	declining	terms	of	trade	assumes	that	primary	commodity	prices	gradually	
decline	in	the	long-run,	the	hypothesis	of	price	volatility	argues	that	dramatic	price	shocks	occur	over	a	
relatively	short	period	of	time	resulting	in	very	volatile	natural	resource	revenues.	This	instability	could	
easily	be	transferred	to	resource-abundant	domestic	economies.	This,	in	turn,	would	affect	the	reliabil-
ity	of	government	revenues	and	foreign	exchange	supplies	(Nurske,	1958;	Levin,	1960).	
Certainly	there	is	plenty	of	empirical	support	for	the	existence	of	such	volatility;	markets	for	primary	
commodities	are	known	for	their	instability.	The	world	market	prices	for	mineral	and	agricultural	com-
modities	are	far	more	volatile	than	prices	of	most	manufactured	products	or	services	whereby	the	prices	
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for	oil	and	natural	gas	are	the	most	volatile	among	them	(followed	by	copper	and	coffee).	The	price	of	oil	
experiences	large	short-	and	medium-term	swings	around	a	longer-term	average	(Frankel,	2010:	9;	see	
also	Dehn,	2001).	In	the	case	of	primary	commodities,	this	volatility	arises	because	demand	fluctuates	
greatly	over	the	business	cycle.12	When	the	economy	is	booming,	the	end-use	sectors	that	consume	most	
mineral	commodities—construction,	capital	equipment,	transportation,	and	consumer	durables—are	
expanding	even	faster	than	the	economy	as	a	whole.	Conversely,	when	the	economy	is	in	a	recession,	
these	sectors	are	usually	even	more	depressed	(Davis/	Tilton,	2005:	236).	
Some	authors	have	suggested	that	it	is	precisely	the	volatility	of	natural	resource	prices,	rather	than	the	
overall	trend	(Prebisch-Singer	hypothesis),	that	hampers	economic	growth	(cf.	e.g.,	Hausmann/	Rigobon,	
2003;	Blattman	et	al.,	2007;	Collier/	Goderisy,	2009;	Van	der	Ploeg/	Poelhekke,	2009;	Arezki/	Brückner,	
2010).	Auty	(1998)	and	Micksell	(1997)	argue	that	the	greater	volatility	of	commodity	prices	(relative	
to	manufactures)	undermines	development	because	the	resulting	large	swings	in	government	revenues	
and	export	earnings	complicate	the	pursuit	of	a	prudent	fiscal	policy	and	aggravate	investor	uncertainty.
In	many	developing	countries,	exports	of	primary	commodities	contribute	to	a	substantial	share	of	gov-
ernment	revenues	directly	(e.g.,	dividends	and	royalties)	and/or	indirectly	(e.g.,	income	tax	and	export	
tax).	Excessive	volatility	of	commodity	prices	has	had	severe	developmental	implications	for	commod-
ity-dependent	nations,	with	cycles	of	booms	and	busts	in	real	national	incomes	creating	problems	for	
macroeconomic	management	and	planning.	As	a	result,	many	governments	in	commodity-dependent	
developing	countries	face	extremely	variable	revenues	due	to	recurring	phases	of	commodity	booms	and	
busts	(cf.	Dehn,	2001;	He/	Westerhoff,	2005;	Mehrara/	Oskoui,	2007;	Humphreys/	Sandbu,	2007).13
‘There	is	 little	dispute	over	the	fact	that	mineral	commodity	markets	are	volatile,	particularly	
over	the	business	cycle	and	that	countries	whose	economies	and	exports	are	dominated	by	a	sin-
gle	mineral	commodity	are	likely	to	face	considerable	swings	in	government	revenues	and	export	
earnings.	Yet	advocates	of	the	conventional	view	of	mining	tend	to	discount	this	concern’	(Davis/	
Tilton,	2005:	237–238).
However,	advocates	of	a	conventional	economic	view	tend	to	discount	this	concern.	Sachs/	Warner	
(1995a,	1999a)	find	no	correlation	between	commodity	price	volatility	and	the	slower	economic	growth.	
Some	authors	argue	that	downturns	in	commodity	prices	often	force	needed	changes	that	would	not	
occur	under	less	stressful	conditions	(cf.	e.g.,	Chaudry,	1997).	When	government	revenues	and	export	
earnings	are	down,	blockades	from	entrenched	interest	groups	are	easier	to	overcome.	Analysing	the	
dynamic	effects	of	commodity	price	fluctuations	on	fiscal	revenues	and	expenditures	for	eight	commod-
ity-exporting	Latin	American	countries,	Medina’s	(2010)	results	indicate	that	the	countries’	fiscal	posi-
tions	react	strongly	to	shocks	to	commodity	prices,	yet	there	are	marked	differences	across	countries.	
This	distinct	behaviour	across	countries	may	relate	to	institutional	arrangements,	which	in	some	cases	
include	the	efficient	application	of	fiscal	rules	amid	political	commitment	and	high	standards	of	trans-
parency.	Similarly,	price	slumps	provide	extractive	companies	with	strong	incentives	to	improve	their	
productivity	and	reduce	their	costs.
Additionally,	it	is	argued	that	governments	can	mitigate	these	revenue	fluctuations	by	establishing	sta-
bilization	funds	(see	Section	3.1.3)	(Davis/	Tilton,	2005:	238).	
12  ‘There are two other conditions that contribute to the short-run fluctuations in mineral commodity prices. First, 
the elasticity or responsiveness of demand to changes in price is small in the short run. Second, the elasticity of 
supply to change in price is also small in the short run once output approaches existing capacity. This means that 
both the short-run supply and demand curves are quite steep, so a shift in either curve will cause the market clear-
ing price to change greatly. The shift occurs in the demand curve as a result of fluctuations in the business cycle’ 
(Davis/ Tilton, 2005: 236).
13  In countries that depend on the exploitation of non-renewable commodities the macroeconomic and fiscal pol-
icy challenges are further pronounced by the uncertainties surrounding the long-term sustainability of their nat-
ural resources. These countries face a trade-off between current and future revenue income; they not only have to 
cope with questions of inter-temporal budget constraints but also of inter-generational equity affecting right of 
future generations to benefit from these resources (Asfaha, 2007: 5).
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2.3.	 ‘Dutch	Disease’
The	term	‘Dutch	disease’14	broadly	refers	to	the	harmful	consequences	of	large,	but	perhaps	temporary,	
increases	in	a	country’s	income	on	exchange	rates	and	eventually	on	trade	balances,	domestic	produc-
tion,	and	the	availability	and	costs	of	credit.	A	large	influx	of	foreign	currency	from	natural	resource	
exports	can	have	serious	repercussions	on	important	segments	of	a	country’s	economy,	as	the	appreci-
ation	of	the	local	currency	diminishes	the	competitiveness	of	non-natural	resource	exports	resulting	in	
the	contraction	in	non-natural	resource	sectors.
Although	the	phenomenon	is	generally	associated	with	a	natural	resource	boom,	it	can	occur	from	
any	development	that	results	in	a	large	inflow	of	foreign	currency,	including	a	sharp	surge	in	natural	
resource	prices,	foreign	development	assistance,	remittances,	foreign	debt	and	foreign	direct	investment	
(Ebrahim-zadeh,	2003;	Asfaha,	2007:	10;	Frankel,	2010:	18).
The	classic	economic	model	of	Dutch	disease	by	Corden/	Neary	(1982)	divides	an	economy	into	three	
sectors:	a	booming	(natural	resource)	export	sector	and	a	lagging,	traditional	export	sector	as	well	as	a	
non-traded	goods	sector,	which	essentially	supplies	the	domestic	market	and	might	include	retail	trade,	
services,	housing	and	construction.	The	model	shows	that	the	now	lagging	traditional	export	sector	
suffers	from	been	crowded	out	by	the	other	two	sectors	(see	also	Gregory,	1976;	Bruno/	Sachs,	1982;	
Roemer,	1983;	Corden,	1984;	Neary/	Van	Wijnbergen,	1986).	For	industrialized	countries	this	gener-
ally	means	a	decline	in	manufacturing,	while	in	developing	countries	this	phenomenon	has	also	been	
observed	in	the	agricultural	sector.	
According	to	Corden/	Neary	(1982)	a	surge	in	the	country’s	natural	resource	exports	initially	raises	
incomes,	as	more	foreign	currency	flows	in.	If	the	foreign	currency	is	converted	into	local	currency	and	
spent	on	domestic	non-traded	goods,	two	effects	can	occur:	(1) the	‘spending	effect’	and	(2) the	‘resource	
movement	effect’.	
(1) The	‘spending	effect’	describes	the	conversion	of	the	foreign	exchange	into	local	currency	that	would	
increase	the	country’s	money	supply;	pressure	from	domestic	demand	in	both	traded	and	non-traded	
goods15	would	push	up	domestic	prices	(in	the	case	of	fixed	exchange	rates)	or	it	would	raise	the	nom-
inal	exchange	rate	(in	the	case	of	flexible	exchange	rates).	In	both	cases,	this	would	result	in	an	appre-
ciation	of	the	real	exchange	rate	(Asfaha,	2007:	10).	Tradable	goods	produced	in	the	country	become	
more	expensive	and	less	competitive	both	domestically	and	abroad.	At	the	same	time,	imports	become	
more	affordable,	thus	squeezing	domestically	produced	goods	out	of	the	market.	This	leads	to	a	wither-
ing	of	non-resource	sectors	of	the	country’s	economy	and	to	an	even	greater	economic	dependence	on	
the	natural	resource	sector.	Additionally,	the	‘spending	effect’	increases	the	demand	for	labour	in	the	
non-traded	goods	sector,	shifting	labour	away	from	the	lagging	export	sector.	This	shift	is	called	‘indi-
rect	deindustrialisation’	(Corden,	1984:	362).	
(2) In	the	‘resource	movement	effect’,	resources	(such	as	capital	and	labour)	would	shift	into	the	pro-
duction	of	domestic	non-traded	goods	to	meet	the	increase	in	domestic	demand	and	into	the	boom-
ing	export	sector.	Both	of	these	shifts	would	shrink	production	in	the	traditional	export	sector	causing	
this	sector	to	contract	(Fardmanesh,	1991:	712).	This	shift	in	labour	and	capital	from	the	lagging	to	the	
booming	export	sector	is	called	‘direct	deindustrialisation’.
Since	the	hydrocarbon	and	mineral	sectors	are	typically	capital-	rather	than	labour-intensive	they	gen-
erally	employ	relatively	few	people;	therefore,	the	shift	in	labour	causing	negative	effects	for	the	lagging	
export	sector	can	be	negligible	(Corden,	1984:	362;	Corden/	Neary,	1982:	827);	than	the	main	effect	
14  The term was coined in 1977 by ‘The Economist’ to describe the decline of the manufacturing sector in the Neth-
erlands after the discovery of a large natural gas field in 1959 (‘The Economist’, The Dutch disease, 26 November 
1977, 82–83; see also Kremers, 1986).
15  Studies show that governments have strong incentives to spend much of the windfall revenues on domestic non-
traded goods such as ambitious infrastructure projects that are often handpicked for political rather than eco-
nomic reasons (cf. e.g., Eifert et al., 2003; Sala-i-Martin/ Subramanian, 2003).
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is	the	spending	effect	(Davis,	1995:	1773).	The	Dutch	disease	might	even	have	the	opposite	effect:	the	
booming	export	sector	can	absorb	only	few	of	the	laid-off	workers	when	the	country’s	broader	econ-
omy	contracts.	
Additionally,	natural	resource	investment	projects,	which	are	in	general	large	relative	to	the	rest	of	the	
economy,	tend	to	absorb	most	of	the	investment	money	available	in	a	country’s	economy,	which	raises	
the	costs	and	lowers	the	volume	of	loans	available	for	other	sectors	(Brecher/	Diaz,	1977;	Brecher/	Finlay,	
1983;	Young/	Miyagiawa,	1986;	Buffie,	1993).	
In	summary,	Dutch	disease	is	argued	to	generate	distorting	macroeconomic	shocks	which	precipitate	
(Cooley,	2001:	165;	Frankel,	2010:	18):	
•	 a	large	real	appreciation	in	the	currency	(taking	the	form	of	nominal	currency	appreciation	if	
the	country	has	a	floating	exchange	rate	or	the	form	of	money	inflows	and	inflation	if	the	coun-
try	has	a	fixed	exchange	rate),	
•	 an	expansion	of	the	state’s	role	in	the	domestic	economy	through an	increase	in	spending	(espe-
cially	by	the	government,	which	for	political	economy	reasons	increases	spending	in	response	
to	the	increased	availability	of	tax	receipts	or	royalties)	and	the	protection	for	the	lagging	sector	
(Corden,	1984:	374–375),
•	 an	increase	in	the	price	of	non-traded	goods	relative	to	traded	goods,
•	 a	resultant	shift	of	labour	and	land	out	of	non-export-commodity	traded	goods	(pulled	by	the	
more	attractive	returns	in	the	export	commodity	and	in	non-traded	goods	and	services),	
•	 a	reduction	in	tax	collection	and	rates	of	domestic	taxation	(Corden,	1984:	366), and
•	 a	current	account	deficit	through	an	ever-increasing	state	budget	that	tends	to	produce	budget	
deficits	when	the	external	flow	of	rents	eventually	diminishes.	
A	resource	boom	requires	adjustments	within	the	economy.	The	‘curse’	in	this	case	is	that	real	exchange	
rate	appreciation	impedes	economic	diversification	and	increases	dependence	on	volatile	commodity	
markets,	and	that	there	are	likely	to	be	significant	adjustment	costs	in	moving	back	to	agriculture	or	
into	manufacturing	following	resource	depletion	or	price	slumps	(Davis/	Tilton,	2005:	236;	Bornhorst	
et	al.,	2009:	439;	Frankel,	2010:	18).
Competitive	manufacturing	industries	do	not	return	as	quickly	or	as	easily	as	they	left;	it	is	difficult	for	
a	country	to	regain	its	competitiveness	and	lost	market	share	mainly	due	to	the	existence	of	sunk-cost	
of	market-entry	(such	as	for	example	costs	of	advertising,	market	research	and	creation	of	marketing	
networks	which	cannot	be	recovered	on	exiting	from	market)	(Asfaha,	2007:	11).	Since	technological	
growth	(learning-by-doing)	is	assumed	to	be	highest	in	the	lagging	(manufacturing)	sector,	there	has	
been	less	technological	growth	in	the	economy	relative	to	other	countries	resulting	in	lost	comparative	
advantages	and	reduced	investments	(Van	Wijnbergen,	1984;	Krugman,	1987;	Sachs/	Warner,	1995b;	
Gylfason	et	al.,	1999).	
Economists	also	worry	that	a	shift	away	from	manufacturing	sectors	might	jeopardize	a	country’s	long-
term	growth	potential	by	choking	off	an	important	source	of	human	capital	development.	Matsuyama	
(1992)	argues	that	a	downturn	in	manufacturing	could	lead	to	a	fall	in	demand	for	education	and	Birdsall	
et	al.	(1997)	found	evidence	that	different	incentives	might	exist	to	invest	 in	education	as	between	
resource-abundant	and	resource	deficient	countries.	
Even	though	there	 is	some	support	 for	the	Dutch	disease	hypothesis,	several	studies	(cf.	e.g.,	Van	
Wijnbergen,	1984;	Krugman,	1987;	Usui,	1996)	suggest	that	these	negative	effects	may	operate	more	
through	political	than	economic	mechanisms	and	that	governments	can	take	action	to	address	these	
problems	(Ross,	1999:	307;	Rosser,	2006:	14;	see	Section	3).	
Gelb	et	al.	(1988)	found	only	mixed	results	regarding	the	resource	movement	effect	for	oil	exporters.	
Other	studies	have	found	that	the	manufacturing	sectors	of	most	oil	exporters	remained	unharmed	
by	export	booms,	though	their	agricultural	sectors	often	suffered	(Benjamin	et	al.,	1989;	Fardmanesh,	
1991).	Also	a	specific	case	study	of	Algeria	(Conway/	Gelb	1988)	actually	found	substantial	exchange	
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rate	depreciation	and	an	improvement	in	both	manufacturing	and	agriculture,	counter	to	the	Dutch	dis-
ease	theory.	However,	it	is	acknowledged	this	is	very	different	from	the	experience	of	most	oil	export-
ers	(Gelb,	1986).
Auty	(1994a)	claims	that	there	is	a	lack	of	evidence	that	the	creation	of	a	manufacturing	industry	can	
have	a	positive	effect	on	an	economy.	Also	Stijns	(2005)	argues	there	is	little	statistical	evidence	to	sug-
gest	a	decline	in	manufacturing	has	a	negative	effect	on	learning-by-doing	and	growth.	
These	different	results	might	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	in	much	of	the	literature	on	Dutch	disease	
attention	is	focussed	on	the	effect	on	manufacturing	(Sachs/	Warner,	1997)	which	reflects	the	simple	
fact	that	much	of	the	earlier	work	concentrated	in	the	developed	countries	(Benjamin	et	al.,	1989).	This	
model,	however,	fits	developing	countries	only	poorly:	it	assumes	that	an	economy’s	capital	and	labour	
supplies	are	fixed	and	fully	employed	before	the	export	boom	starts.	However,	developing	countries	typ-
ically	have	labour	surpluses	and	their	natural	resource	booms	attract	foreign	capital	and	labour	offset-
ting	any	local	scarcities	(Ross,	1999:	306).	This	raises	the	question	whether	a	contraction	of	the	manu-
facturing	sector	should	be	an	issue	for	concern	in	developing/	less	industrialized	countries.	However,	as	
the	condition	of	Dutch	disease	began	to	be	attributed	to	developing	countries	then	attention	did	switch	
to	agriculture	as	the	main	source	of	traded	goods	(Benjamin	et	al.,	1989).	While	de-industrialization	
failed	to	materialize	in	most	mineral	economies,	Davis	(1995:	1769)	noticed	a	de-agriculturalization	for	
developing	countries	in	combination	with	a	booming	government	sector.
Davis	(1995:	1768)	even	emphasizes	the	benefits	of	the	Dutch	‘disease’	which	he	considers	a	simple	
change	in	competitive	advantages	and	from	equilibrium	to	another.	‘There	is	nothing	inherently	growth-
inhibiting	in	mineral	booms	and	any	resulting	Dutch	disease	phenomenon.’	(Davis,	1995:	1768)	There	is,	
however,	a	‘burden	of	adjustment’	for	the	lagging	sector	(Davis,	1995:	1768;	Davis/	Tilton,	2005:	238).
3.	 Challenges	for	Economic	and	Fiscal	Policy
Most	recent	work	on	the	relationship	between	natural	resource	abundance	and	economic	performance	
has	given	much	greater	attention	to	the	role	of	political	variables	in	mediating	this	relationship	(cf.	e.g.,	
Auty,	2001c,	2001d;	Torvik,	2002;	Eifert	et	al.,	2003;	Rodrik,	2003;	Isham	et	al.,	2005).	Focusing	on	
the	behaviour	of	those	who	control	the	state,	both	economists	and	political	scientists	have	agreed	that	
the	immediate	cause	of	poor	economic	performance	in	resource-abundant	countries	has	been	poor	eco-
nomic	management	and	waste	in	combination	with	rent-seeking	and	corruption	(Lal/	Myint,	1996;	
Mikesell,	1997;	Leite/	Weidmann,	2002).	
Even	when	the	rents	are	not	squandered,	but	used	by	the	government	to	promote	economic	develop-
ment,	the	results	are	often	disappointing	due	to	incompetence	and	poor	planning	(Davis/	Tilton,	2005:	
236).	In	particular,	they	have	pointed	to	fiscal	profligacy,	overvalued	exchange	rates,	excessive	protec-
tion,	and	inefficient	use	of	resource	windfalls	as	being	the	main	problems	in	this	respect	(Mitra,	1994;	
Usui,	1997;	Karl,	1997;	Anderson,	1998;	Ascher,	1999).	
In	resource-abundant	countries,	political	elites	have	tended	to	take	the	opportunity	to	either	directly	
seize	the	rents	created	by	resource	booms	or	gain	control	over	the	right	to	allocate	in	order	to	use	them	
to	pursue	various	programmatic	and	political	objectives.	This	includes	financing	controversial	develop-
ment	programs,	providing	economic	benefits	to	particular	groups,	capturing	rents	for	the	government	
treasury	and	evading	accountability	(Ascher,	1999;	Ross,	2001c;	Robinson	et	al.,	2002).	
3.1.	 Poor	Resource	Management
3.1.1.	 State	Ownership16
Given	that	in	most	legal	regimes,	natural	resources	are	the	property	of	the	state,	the	revenues	in	the	first	
instance	accrue	to	the	government.	This	inevitably	invites	greater	government	involvement	in	the	exploi-
tation	of	natural	resources,	which	many	authors	see	a	major	part	of	the	explanation	of	poor	resource	man-
agement	(Stevens,	1986;	Auty,	1998;	Auty/	Mikesell,	1998;	Ascher,	1999;	Ross,	1999;	Sarraf/	Jiwanji,	
2001;	Wolf,	2009;	for	the	Caspian	region	see	Kjærnet,	forthcoming).17	For	example,	Mikesell	(1997)	
argues	that	in	the	case	of	Venezuela	it	was	bad	government	management	that	caused	the	problems	rather	
than	direct	distortions	from	the	export	booms	of	the	1970s	and	1980s.	
Stressing	the	importance	of	private	ownership	as	a	source	of	capitalist	incentives	to	innovate,	most	econ-
omists	share	the	view	that	government	ownership	in	itself	generally	breeds	inefficiency,	both	produc-
tive	and	allocative	(Boardman/	Vining,	1989;	Ehrlich	et	al.,	1994).	Inefficiency	can	be	defined	as	the	
unemployment	and	misallocation	of	resources.	They	argue	that	politicians,	as	guardians	of	state-owned	
property,	are	not	unbiased	and	do	not	always	act	in	the	public	interest,	and	that	inefficiency	is	a	result	of	
the	government’s	deliberate	policy	of	transferring	resources	to	supporters,	soft	budget	constraints,	fis-
cal	laxity	and	a	tendency	to	over-borrow	(Kornai,	1986;	Shleifer/	Vishny,	1994).	
These	assumptions	were	made	for	competitive	markets	with	an	unlimited	number	of	competitors,	per-
fect	information	and	no	entrance	barriers.	The	oil	and	gas	sector,	however,	is	generally	characterised	by	
an	oligopolistic	structure	and	the	dominance	of	a	limited	number	of	large	companies.	Extreme	econom-
ics	of	scale	within	the	production	process	hamper	the	entry	of	new	companies	into	the	sector.	Compe-
16  This section is strongly based on Heinrich (2008: 1540–1541).
17  Shafer (1983) argues that multinational corporations could function as a buffer against export instabilities (price 
volatilities) of primary commodities; a nationalization wave in the 1970s, however, shut out multinational oil com-
panies from oil exploitation in most of the developing countries.
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tition	is	further	limited	by	the	sector’s	reliance	on	pipelines,	especially	for	the	transport	of	natural	gas.	
Furthermore,	pipelines	only	allow	for	regional,	often	monopolistic	markets	(Banks,	2000).
In	most	of	the	major	oil	and	gas	producing	countries,	these	resources	generate	a	huge	part	of	the	state	
budget.	The	profitability	of	the	industry	provides	huge	incentives	for	corruption	(Humphreys	et	al.,	
2007a,	2007b).	In	such	an	environment	private	companies	do	not	necessarily	operate	more	efficiently	
than	state-owned	ones.	In	his	analysis	of	the	role	of	the	state	in	the	oil	and	gas	industry,	Stiglitz	(2007:	
27)	concludes:	‘What	has	happened	in	the	last	two	decades	has	made	it	abundantly	clear	that	privatiza-
tion	does	not	eliminate	scope	for	corruption,	or	more	generally,	eliminate	agency	problems.’	There	are	
state-owned	companies	in	the	oil	and	gas	sector	that	are	‘both	efficient	and	incorruptible’	and	have	per-
formed	impressively	for	a	long	time,	most	notably	Norway’s	state	oil	company	Statoil	(Stiglitz,	2007:	30).	
However,	these	companies	are	embedded	in	strong	institutional	settings	with	secure	property	rights,	
clear	rules	for	the	market	players	and	functioning	regulatory	agencies;	in	addition,	they	are	exposed	to	
market	pressures	and	competition.	For	state-owned	enterprises	to	work	efficiently,	they	require	compe-
tent	management	that	is	shielded	from	political	meddling.	If	markets	are	functioning	properly,	corporate	
management	can	work	independently	of	politicians	and	the	institutional	settings	are	more	likely	to	be	
robust.	In	this	kind	of	environment,	the	actual	ownership	form	has	less	effect	on	the	efficiency	of	com-
pany	operations.	Thus,	the	institutional	setting	and	the	political	attitude	of	the	government	in	charge	is	
an	important	criterion	for	the	efficiency	of	the	oil	and	gas	sector.	That	is,	in	a	weak	institutional	environ-
ment	companies	tend	to	be	less	efficient	(Yakovlev,	2004:	148–155;	Stiglitz,	2007:	34–38).
3.1.2.	 Procyclicality
The	fact	that	developing	countries	tend	to	experience	larger	cyclical	fluctuations	than	industrialized	
countries	is	only	partly	attributable	to	commodities.	The	literature	on	development	has	intensively	doc-
umented	that	commodity	booms	and	busts	are	often	badly	handled	(cf.	Gelb	et	al.,	1988;	Bevan	et	al.,	
1989,	1993).	The	general	conclusion	is	that	the	adverse	consequences	of	a	resource	boom	are	mainly	a	
result	of	poor	management	of	windfall	revenues:	the	unwise	use	of	large	windfall	revenues	contributes	to	
economic	degeneration.	But	while	booms	may	not	translate	into	sustained	higher	incomes,	busts	almost	
certainly	cause	long-lasting	detrimental	effects	(Collier,	2003).	Reviewing	the	experiences	of	18	devel-
oping	countries	that	experienced	favourable	terms	of	trade	shocks	(relative	increases	in	their	export	
prices)	during	1974	to	1989,	Little	et	al.	(1993)	show	that	these	countries	did	not	grow	more	than	coun-
tries	that	experienced	negative	terms	of	trade	shocks	during	the	same	period.	Besides	the	loss	of	com-
petitiveness	in	non-booming	industrial	and	agricultural	sectors	(Dutch	disease),	the	poor	management	
of	windfall	revenues	from	the	commodity	booms	were	cited	as	the	major	causes.
Volatility	in	developing	countries	arises	from	domestic	macroeconomic	and	political	 instability	that	
tend	to	exacerbate	booms	and	busts	cycle	instead	of	moderating	them.	Most	developing	countries	are	
still	subject	to	monetary	and	fiscal	policy	that	is	procyclical	rather	than	countercyclical:	they	tend	to	be	
expansionary	in	booms	(spending	goes	up	and	taxes	go	down)	and	contractionary	in	recessions	(spend-
ing	goes	down	and	taxes	up),	thus	exacerbating	the	magnitudes	of	the	commodity	price	swings	rather	
than	to	moderate	them.	Besides	the	fact	that	short-term	revenue	instability	presents	serious	challenges	
for	macroeconomic	planning,	often	income	inequality	and	populist	policies	are	the	fundamental	roots	
underlying	the	procyclicality	(Asfaha,	2007:	5;	Frankel,	2010:	19).
3.1.2.1.	 The	Procyclicality	of	Fiscal	Policy	(Government	Spending)
Many	authors	have	documented	that	fiscal	policy	tends	to	be	procyclical	in	developing	countries,	espe-
cially	in	comparison	with	industrialized	countries	(Gavin/	Perotti,	1997;	Kaminsky	et	al.,	2005;	Talvi/	
Végh,	2005;	Mendoza/	Oviedo,	2006,	Alesina	et	al.,	2008;	Ilzetski/	Vegh,	2008;	Medas/	Zakharova,	
2009;	Arezki/	Ismail,	2010).	Procyclicality	is	especially	pronounced	in	countries	that	possess	natural	
resources	and	where	income	from	those	resources	tends	to	dominate	the	business	cycle	(cf.	Cuddington,	
1989).	Most	studies	look	at	the	procyclicality	of	government	spending,	because	tax	receipts	are	partic-
ularly	endogenous	with	respect	to	the	business	cycle.	An	important	reason	for	procyclical	spending	is	
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precisely	that	government	receipts	from	taxes	or	royalties	rise	in	booms,	and	the	government	cannot	
resist	the	temptation	or	political	pressure	to	increase	spending	proportionately,	or	more	than	propor-
tionately	(Frankel,	2010:	20).	
Studying	the	cyclical	behaviour	of	public	spending	on	health	and	education	in	150	countries	during	
1987–2007,	Arze	del	Granado	et	al.	(2010a)	find	that	spending	on	education	and	health	is	procyclical	
in	developing	countries	and	acyclical	in	developed	countries.	In	addition,	education	and	health	expen-
ditures	are	procyclical	during	boom	periods	and	acyclical	during	bust	periods.	Furthermore,	the	degree	
of	cyclicality	is	higher	the	lower	the	level	of	economic	development.
Two	budget	items	account	for	much	of	the	increased	spending	from	resource	booms:	(1) investment	
projects,	and	(2) the	government	wage	bill.	
(1) Well	designed	infrastructure	investment	can	have	large	long-term	pay-off	effects	(De	Long/	Sum-
mers,	1991);	in	practice,	however,	governments	tend	to	squander	windfall	revenues	on	hastily	executed	
programs	that	involve	projects	that	earn	a	low	return	and	are	irreversible	(Deaton/	Miller,	1995).	Thus,	
Talvi/	Végh	(2005)	argue	that	such	public	investments	should	be	viewed	as	government	consumption,	
since	non-productive	investment	will	not	generate	future	returns.	Three	major	factors	may	explain	the	
low	returns	of	public	investment	projects	(Asfaha,	2007:	9):	First,	because	of	rent-seeking	behaviour	
(see	Section	3.3.1),	a	substantial	share	of	public	investment	might	flow	into	projects	that	generate	short-
term	political	gains	to	governments	rather	than	to	projects	with	high	economic	returns.	Second,	many	
projects	have	taken	the	form	of	‘white	elephants’,	which	take	too	long	to	complete	or	are	abandoned	with-
out	funds	for	completion	or	maintenance,	when	commodity	prices	fall	again	and	revenues	wane	(Gelb,	
1986;	Deaton/	Miller,	1996).	Third,	government	agencies	in	charge	of	fiscal	policy	(typically	ministries	
of	finance)	may	lack	control	over	government	spending	agencies	(such	as	health	and	social	welfare	agen-
cies	etc.)	caused	by	a	lack	of	transparency	and	timely	information	on	expenditure	by	these	agencies	(cf.	
Premchand,	2000;	Kopits,	2000).
(2) Oil	windfalls	have	also	often	been	spent	on	higher	public	sector	wages,	to	increase	the	number	of	
workers	employed	by	the	government	or	on	current	transfers	and	subsidies—on	goods	such	as	food,	fer-
tilizer	or	petroleum	(Gupta/	Miranda,	1991;	Robinson	et	al.,	2006).	These	measures	raise	the	total	public	
sector	wage	bill	and,	for	political	reasons,	are	hard	to	reverse	when	commodity	prices	decrease	again.	In	
other	words,	the	expansion	in	current	account	expenditures	gets	entrenched	(Asfaha,	2007:	8;	Frankel,	
2010:	20).	Plotting	the	public	sector	wage	bill	against	primary	commodity	prices	for	Iran	and	Indonesia,	
Frankel	(2005)	finds	a	strong	positive	relationship	with	a	three-year	lag	that	illustrates	the	problem:	oil	
prices	may	have	fallen	over	three	years,	but	public	sector	wages	cannot	easily	be	cut	nor	workers	laid	off.
3.1.2.2.	 The	Procyclicality	of	Capital	Flows	(Borrowing,	Foreign	Debt)
According	to	economic	theory,	countries	should	borrow	during	temporary	downturns	in	order	to	sus-
tain	consumption	and	investment,	and	should	repay	or	accumulate	net	foreign	assets	during	temporary	
upturns.	In	practice,	however,	capital	flows	are	more	often	procyclical	than	countercyclical	(Gavin	et	
al.,	1996;	Kaminsky	et	al.,	2004;	Mendoza/	Terrones,	2008;	Reinhart/	Reinhart,	2009).	One	interpre-
tation	of	procyclical	capital	flows	is	that	they	result	from	procyclical	fiscal	policy:	when	governments	
increase	spending	in	resource	booms,	some	of	the	deficit	is	financed	by	external	borrowing.	Usui	(1997:	
154)	calls	this	a	‘boom-based	borrowing	capacity’	because	the	borrowing	capacity	of	booming	econ-
omies	might	be	improved	drastically	as	they	appear	more	attractive	to	lenders	in	donor	countries.	The	
country’s	natural	resources	act	as	collateral	leading	to	more	credit.	In	addition,	if	the	real	exchange	rate	
increases	through	the	inflows	of	resource	revenues	(see	Dutch	disease),	this	makes	the	interest	pay-
ments	on	the	debt	cheaper	further	contributing	to	the	Dutch	disease	effect.18	Hence,	commodity	booms	
in	some	countries	fuel	the	debt	accumulation	process.	
18  However, Mansoorian (1991) argues that heavy external borrowing eventually leads to depreciation.
20 Andreas Heinrich
Debt-financed	investment	projects	(like	investment	projects	in	resource-rich	countries	in	general)	often	
fail	to	develop	the	productive	base	of	the	economy.	There	was	a	tendency	to	invest	in	non-traded	goods,	
especially	in	the	military,	and	to	indulge	in	prestige	projects	(see	above)	(Lal/	Myint,	1996;	Sarraf/	
Jiwanji,	2001).	Nevertheless,	loans	must	be	serviced	and	repaid.	When	governments	are	forced	to	cut	
spending	in	downturns	due	to	falling	commodities	prices,	they	still	have	to	repay	some	of	the	excessive	
debt	that	they	incurred	during	the	upturn.	In	combination	with	a	falling	real	exchange	rate,	a	government	
would	have	less	money	with	which	to	pay	a	more	expensive	debt	(Asfaha,	2007:	9;	Frankel,	2010:	19–20).
3.1.3.	 National	Wealth	Funds
Fluctuations	in	government	revenues	and	export	earnings	that	might	hamper	economic	development	
can	be	mitigated	by	governments.	National	wealth	funds	(also	called	sovereign	wealth	funds,	stabili-
zation	funds	or	saving	funds)	have	become	a	major	instrument	to	manage	a	large	share	of	the	revenues	
the	state	derives	from	resource	exploitation	(cf.	e.g.,	Davis	et	al.,	2001;	Bahgat,	2008;	Hammer,	2008;	
Ahmadov	et	al.,	2009;	Luecke,	2011;	Kalyuzhnova/	Nygaard,	2011).	In	particular,	during	a	resource	
boom,	governments	can	transfer	some	of	their	commodity	revenues	into	a	national	wealth	fund	which	
in	turn	invests	the	money	on	global	stock	markets	and/or	domestic	welfare	programmes.	When	the	mar-
kets	are	depressed,	governments	can	withdraw	the	accumulated	revenues	and/or	the	investment	profits	
to	support	programmes	that	otherwise	they	would	be	forced	to	curtail	(Brown	et	al.,	2010).
However,	the	results	of	these	wealth	funds	have	been	mixed,	and	the	experience	of	some	countries	has	
been	disappointing.	Some	research	shows	that	a	positive	performance	depends	on	better	governance	and	
stronger	institutional	arrangements	in	order	to	correct	occurring	problems	(Davis/	Tilton,	2005:	238;	for	
examples	from	the	Caspian	region	see	Aslanli,	forthcoming	and	Kalyuzhnova,	forthcoming).	Shabsigh/	
Ilahi	(2007)	argue	that	a	broader	focus	is	needed	in	judging	the	effectiveness	of	such	funds;	they	test	
whether	oil	funds	help	reduce	macroeconomic	volatility.	The	results	suggest	that	oil	funds	are	associated	
with	reduced	volatility	of	broad	money	and	prices	and	lower	inflation.	However,	there	is	a	statistically	
weak	negative	association	between	the	presence	of	an	oil	fund	and	volatility	of	the	real	exchange	rate.
Grennes	(2009)	evaluates	sovereign	wealth	funds	in	light	of	the	extreme	volatility	of	energy	prices	and	the	
severe	global	recession	that	began	in	2008.	Recent	developments	have	reduced	the	relative	importance	
of	funds	and	have	demonstrated	the	sensitivity	of	the	funds	to	energy	prices	and	world	business	cycles.	
Beyond	their	economic	importance,	Shih	(2009)	states	that	wealth	funds	are	likely	tools	of	domes-
tic	political	survival.	In	examining	the	underlying	institutional	and	political	environment	in	which	
national	wealth	funds	in	Singapore	and	in	China	operate,	the	author	examines	the	role	of	political	unity	
in	directing	fund	behaviour	in	authoritarian	regimes.	The	main	finding	is	that	a	highly	unified	autoc-
racy	is	more	likely	to	direct	funds	to	maximise	long-term	profit,	while	a	fragmented	one	like	China	is	
more	likely	to	treat	a	sovereign	wealth	fund	as	an	arena	for	domestic	political	and	bureaucratic	infight-
ing.	Funds	operating	in	a	fragmented	regime	are	unlikely	to	make	long-term	profit	and	foreign	policy	
objectives	top	economic	priorities.
3.2.	 Industrial	Policy
3.2.1.	 Import	Substitution
The	industrial	policy	adopted	in	many	resource-rich	countries	following	the	revenue	windfall	has	often	
led	to	unsustainable	investment	decisions.	Most	resource-rich	countries	have	failed	to	promote	a	com-
petitive	manufacturing	sector	which	many	development	economists	regarded	as	a	principal	source	of	
technological	and	economic	progress	(Krause,	1995;	Mikesell,	1997;	Ranis,	1991;	Sachs/	Warner,	1995a).
While	the	Prebisch-Singer	hypothesis	has	never	been	universally	accepted	(see	Frankel,	2010),	their	
argument,	however,	has	influenced	many	developing	countries	to	resort	to	autarkic	policies	in	the	form	
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of	import	substitution.	As	a	counter	measure	to	deteriorating	terms	of	trade,	import	substitution	is	sup-
posed	to	protect	domestic	manufacturers	from	foreign	competition	in	order	to	develop	a	competitive	
domestic	industrial	base	regarded	as	a	principal	source	of	technological	and	economic	progress	(Davis/	
Tilton,	2005:	234).	Many	resource-rich	countries,	especially	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	adopted	such	an	
industrial	policy	as	a	means	to	break	out	of	the	circle	of	underdevelopment	(Ranis,	1991;	Krause,	1995;	
Mikesell,	1997;	Auty/	Kiiski,	2001).	This	policy	invariably	had	two	components:	(1) the	introduction	
of	subsidy,	and	(2) growing	protectionism.	
(1) Very	often	governments	use	revenues	from	the	natural	resource	sector	to	introduce	heavy	subsidies	
in	order	to	promote	the	creation	of	a	domestic	manufacturing	industry,	usually	based	on	some	sort	of	
infant	industry	argument.	However,	infant	industries	have	a	strong	tendency	not	to	grow	up	(Bell	et	al.,	
1984)	and	are	incapable	of	earning	foreign	exchange	(Auty,	1994a).	Subsidies	too	often	set	in	motion	a	
disastrous	cycle:	in	many	cases,	they	are	awarded	on	the	basis	of	political	patronage	and	effectively	prop	
up	unprofitable	domestic	enterprises	rewarding	inefficiency,	poor	management,	and	over-employment	
in	these	enterprises.	However,	the	creation	of	subsidies	and	the	subsequent	rent-seeking	created	pow-
erful	interest	groups	diverting	revenue	flows	from	the	promotion	of	a	manufacturing	industry	to	other	
uses	(Sarraf/	Jiwanji,	2001;	Auty,	1994a).	Spending	large	sums	of	money	on	sustaining	patronage	net-
works	and/or	providing	huge	subsidies	to	the	population	to	garner	social	and	political	support	becomes	
an	entrenched	behaviour	of	governments	in	resource-rich	countries	which	are	reluctant	to	remove	the	
subsidies	against	the	will	of	these	interest	groups	(cf.	e.g.,	Anderson,	1987;	Chaudhry,	1989;	Karl,	1997).	
Subsidising	energy	to	final	consumers	in	oil	exporting	countries,	for	instance,	is	sometimes	justified	as	
an	effective	way	of	distributing	some	of	the	resource	rents	to	the	populace.	Petri/	Taube	(2003)	find	
that	many	successor	states	of	the	former	Soviet	Union	(FSU)	continue	to	use	low	energy	prices	and	
the	toleration	of	payment	arrears	to	provide	large	implicit	and	untargeted	subsidies	to	households	and	
enterprises.	These	quasi-fiscal	activities	cause	over-consumption	and	waste,	and	contribute	to	macr-
oeconomic	imbalances.	These	activities	have	declined	in	some	of	the	energy-importing	countries,	but	
risen	in	energy-rich	countries	(e.g.,	Azerbaijan,	Russia	and	Turkmenistan),	largely	on	account	of	higher	
international	oil	prices.	In	similar	vein,	Jensen/	Tarr	(2002)	find	that	Iran	subsidizes	domestic	energy	
product	by	about	90%	of	the	cost	of	energy	products	justifying	these	interventions	as	helping	the	poor.	
However,	when	commodity	prices	fall,	subsidies	became	unsustainable;	governments,	in	turn,	borrow	
to	maintain	their	spending	commitments.	Moreover,	Arze	del	Granado	et	al.	(2010b)	show	that	fuel	sub-
sidies	are	a	costly	approach	to	protecting	the	poor	due	to	substantial	benefit	leakage	to	higher	income	
groups.	In	absolute	terms,	the	top	income	quintile	captures	six	times	more	in	subsidies	than	the	bottom.	
(2) Protectionism	and	closed	trade	regimes	are	introduced	to	allow	the	(subsidized)	infant	industry	to	
grow;	these	measures	tend	to	hinder	economic	growth	to	some	extent	compared	to	more	open	econo-
mies	(Sachs/	Warner,	1997).	While	Sachs/	Warner	(1995b)	found	that	countries	depending	on	primary	
resource	exports	tend	to	have	a	closed	trade	regime,	they	also	discovered	that	above	a	certain	threshold	
of	resource	export	dependence	trade	policy	began	to	open	up	(e.g.,	in	Saudi	Arabia).	
Once	subsidies	and	protectionist	measures	are	in	place,	continuing	resource	revenues	and	powerful	
domestic	interest	groups	tend	to	reduce	the	incentive	to	create	competitive	manufacturing	industries.	
Auty/	Kiiske	(2001:	28)	identify	as	the	key	problem	that	
‘the	relaxation	of	market	discipline	and	associated	accumulation	of	economic	distortions	[…]	
retards	competitive	diversification	and	lies	at	the	heart	of	the	underperformance	of	the	resource	
abundant	countries’.
In	a	similar	vein,	Krugman	(1987)	finds	that	a	temporary	resource	boom	leads	to	an	‘enduring’	loss	of	
competitiveness,	while	a	competitive	industrial	policy	based	upon	a	strong	export	orientation	maintains	
the	competitiveness	(Auty,	1994a).
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3.2.2.	 Taxation
Shafer	(1994)	and	Karl	(1997)	suggest	that	the	characteristics	of	the	leading	export	sector	not	only	influ-
ence	both	policy	preferences	of	the	sector’s	firms	and	their	ability	to	influence	the	state	in	their	‘direc-
tion’	(see	also	Paige,	1975;	Frieden,	1991)19,	but	the	sector’s	characteristics	also	influence	the	institu-
tional	capacity	and	autonomy	of	the	state	itself	(Ross,	1999:	314).	As	a	consequence,	taxation	in	a	country	
experiencing	a	resource	boom	focuses	on	the	leading	oligopolistic	resource	sector	(as	does	promotion)	
while	non-leading	sectors	are	neglected.	The	state	fails	to	establish	institutions	to	tax,	monitor,	regulate	
or	promote	other	(non-leading)	sectors	(see	also	Gehlbach,	2008	for	a	similar	argument).	
In	general,	a	government	has	two	sources	of	revenue.	First,	it	is	the	direct	recipient	of	the	income	flow	
from	the	natural	resource.	This	is	literally	true	in	the	case	of	mineral	resources,	where	governments	either	
directly	sell	licenses	to	foreign	extraction	companies	or	operate	the	extractive	activity	directly	through	
a	government-owned	company.	The	second	source	of	government	revenue	is	taxes	on	the	income	gen-
erated	by	the	private	sector.	Industrial	output	is	a	more	elastic	tax	base	than	natural	resources,	and	the	
government	cannot	appropriate	the	totality	of	it	without	inducing	greatly	reduced	effort,	evasion,	and	
diversion	to	the	shadow	economy.	Natural	resource	revenues,	on	the	other	hand,	are	a	less	elastic	tax	
base	than	industrial	output,	and	hence	they	will	be	taxed	at	a	higher	rate	(Caselli,	2006:	4–5;	see	also	
Cordon,	1984:	366).
The	rentier	state	theory20	assumes	that	the	inflow	of	windfall	revenues	from	natural	resource	exports	
will	weaken	a	country’s	incentive	to	mobilize	other	(non-resource	related)	domestic	revenues.	This	is	
particularly	the	case	for	commodities	whose	proceeds	directly	accrue	into	government	coffers.21	Direct	
income	from	commodities	can	reduce	the	government’s	incentives	to	establish	robust	systems	and	insti-
tutions	for	tax	collection	and	tax-base	diversification	because	this	is	less	costly	for	the	government,	both	
economically	and	politically,	than	collecting	tax	revenue	from	the	public.	The	phenomenon	of	a	‘distrib-
utive	state’	‘eventually	results	in	a	lack	of	crucial	state	capacity:	natural	resources	are	posited	to	obvi-
ate	extractive	bureaucracies	and	the	relations	with	social	groups	necessary	to	collect	taxes	effectively’	
(Smith,	2004:	233).	As	a	result,	the	rentier	state	theory	argues,	such	governments	depend	less	on	taxes	
and	their	citizenry;	not	collecting	taxes	from	its	citizenry	has	freed	governments	from	accountability	
to	society	and	they	are,	therefore,	less	pressed	to	provide	for	their	needs	and	feel	no	obligation	to	repre-
sent	either	(cf.	Mahdavy,	1970;	Luciani,	1987;	Anderson,	1987;	Crystal,	1990;	Chaudhry,	1997;	Vande-
walle,	1998;	Moore,	2000,	2004).22
Focusing	on	the	relationship	between	natural	resource	endowments	and	the	domestic	(non-resource-
related)	revenue	effort	in	hydrocarbon-rich	countries,	Bornhorst	et	al.	(2009)	find	empirical	support	
for	the	thesis	that	governments	relying	on	revenues	from	oil	and	natural	gas	related	activities	are	likely	
to	mobilize	less	revenue	from	other	domestic	sources.	They	show	that	countries	that	receive	large	rev-
enues	from	the	exploitation	of	hydrocarbon	endowments	will	reduce	their	domestic	tax	effort	consid-
erably	(by	about	20%).	
‘While	this	in	itself	need	not	inhibit	economic	development,	at	the	very	least	it	suggests	that	there	
might	be	significant	adjustment	costs	in	moving	to	a	higher	level	of	domestic	taxation	once	resources	
are	depleted’	(Bornhorst	et	al.,	2009:	440–441).
19  Monopolistic/ oligopolistic sectors are stronger/ better able to influence the state and demand protection from 
international market forces.
20  For a discussion of the rentier state theory see Richter, forthcoming.
21  This applies especially to point-source resources which are ‘resources that are more easily controlled by an elite 
and do not need widespread labor, the rule of law or infrastructure such as roads’ (Hartford/ Klein, 2005: 1–2)
22  A similar argument has been made with respect to foreign aid as a disincentive to mobilize domestic fiscal re-
sources, particularly when institutions are weak and corruption is rampant (Bauer, 1972; Gupta et al., 2004).
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3.3.	 Rent-seeking/	Corruption
Huge	inflows	of	revenues	from	natural	resource	exports	tend	to	fuel	rent-seeking	behaviour	and	politi-
cal	corruption	(cf.	e.g.,	Robinson	et	al.,	2006).	Having	large	amounts	of	money	at	ones	disposal	is	bound	
to	increase	the	temptation	on	the	part	of	the	decision-makers	to	maintain	authority	through	allocating	
resources	to	favoured	constituents	than	through	sustainable	growth-oriented	economic	policies	and/
or	to	enrich	themselves	(Leite/	Weidmann,	2002).	
3.3.1.	 Use	of	Rents/	Rent-seeking
Rent-seeking	concerns	how	people	compete	for	‘artificially	contrived	transfers’	(Tollison,	1982:	576).	
Political	control	of	natural	resource	rents	makes	it	worthwhile	for	individuals	and	organizations	to	devote	
considerable	effort	and	resources	to	appropriating	a	larger	share	of	these	rents.	Interest	groups	seek	to	
capture	transfers	created	by	government	or	to	incite	the	government	to	create	such	transfers	(Mbaku,	
1992).	Such	rent-seeking	activities	are	unproductive;	they	are	devoted	to	increase	the	own	share	of	exist-
ing	revenue	flows	that	a	particular	group	enjoys,	rather	than	to	increase	the	size	of	the	revenues	itself.	
The	result	is	that	the	expenditure	creates	no	social	value	and,	more	importantly,	distorts	markets	and	
hence	the	way	the	economy	operates	(cf.	e.g.,	Krueger,	1974,	1990;	Buchanan	et	al.,	1980;	Tollison,	1982;	
McChesney,	1987;	Rowley	et	al.,	1988;	Mahon,	1992).	
A	common	consequence	of	rent-seeking	is	the	creation	of	monopoly	power	(via	regulation)	in	an	econ-
omy	and	Wenders	(1987)	shows	that	the	social	costs	of	monopolization	are	higher	if	the	costs	to	main-
tain	that	monopoly	are	added.	The	increased	welfare	costs	include	monopoly	costs	(Harberger	costs),	
rent-seeking	costs	(Tullock	costs)23	and	rent-defending	costs	(in	case	of	other	interests	trying	to	dereg-
ulate	the	monopoly)24.
Rent	seeking	creates	and	strengthens	extremely	powerful,	well-connected	lobby	groups	who	are	able	
to	block	much	needed	economic	reforms	(Auty,	1995).	These	groups	are	able	to	increase	pressure	on	
governments	to	pursue	economic	policies	that	serve	the	interests	of	these	groups	rather	than	the	com-
mon	economic	interest	(Mahon,	1992;	Auty,	1995;	Broad,	1995;	James,	2010).	Rent	seeking	makes	it	
more	difficult	for	governments	to	adjust	spending	when	faced	with	revenue	fluctuations	(Auty,	2001b).	
There	is	general	agreement	that	rent-seeking	behaviour	produces	undesirable	results	for	and	imposes	
significant	 losses	on	many	economies	by	distracting	attention	from	goals	of	 long-term	development	
towards	maximizing	rent-creation	and	-capture	(Gelb,	1988;	Auty,	1990,	1998;	Bhagwati,	1992;	Lane/	
Tornell,	1995,	1996;	Sachs/	Warner,	1997;	Tornell/	Lane,	1999;	Svensson,	2000;	Baland/	Francois,	
2000;	Torvick,	2002).
Several	explanations	can	be	offered	why	rent-seeking	is	greater	in	countries	with	large	oil,	gas	or	min-
eral	revenues.	
(1) Torvik	(2002),	for	instance,	has	argued	that	natural	resource	abundance	increases	the	rewards	that	
social	actors	can	gain	from	rent-seeking,	and	in	turn	provides	them	with	greater	incentive	to	engage	in	
such	behaviour.	An	increase	in	resource	endowment	shifts	entrepreneurs	from	the	productive	sector	
to	the	rent-seeking	sector.	In	similar	vein,	Mehlum	et	al.	(2006)	construct	a	model	with	two	sectors:	a	
‘grabbing’	sector	and	a	‘productive’	sector.	The	economy	admits	two	classes	of	equilibria	depending	on	
an	exogenous	institutional	quality	parameter:	a	production	equilibrium,	in	which	a	resource	boom	is	a	
blessing	and	a	grabbing	equilibrium	in	which	a	resource	boom	is	a	curse.
23  ‘[…] when monopoly power is achieved via regulation, at least part of the monopoly rents so gained will not be sim-
ple transfers from consumers to producers, but will be dissipated by producers’ rent-seeking activity’ (Wenders, 
1987: 456).
24  Rent-defending costs (costs for the consumers in their defence efforts) occur when ‘there are parallel activities 
and resource expenditures by those who stand to lose from restrictive regulations as they seek to defend against 
rent-seeking activity and deflect it among themselves’ (Wenders, 1987: 457). 
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(2) One	group	argues	that	rent-seeking	is	greater	because	natural	resource	wealth	(especially	point-
source	resources)	is	concentrated	in	the	public	sector	(as	natural	resource	rents	captured	by	the	state	
end	up	in	government	coffers)	and	possibly	in	a	small	number	of	companies	(Auty,	1998).	Thus	‘the	bulk	
of	the	rents	created	in	these	economies	are	channelled	by	bureaucrats,	the	majority	of	whom	are	mem-
bers	of	the	politically	dominant	group	[…]’	(Mbaku,	1992:	250).	In	similar	vein,	Ascher	(1999)	argues	
that	state	officials	can	easily	manipulate	the	use	of	resource	revenues	to	meet	unpopular,	controversial,	
or	illegal	objectives.	
(3) Robinson	et	al.	(2006)	have	suggested	that	such	rent-seeking	behaviour	is	most	likely	to	lead	to	neg-
ative	economic	outcomes	when	resource	booms	are	perceived	to	be	temporary	because	political	elites	
will	focus	on	maximising	the	rents	that	they	can	extract	in	the	short-term.	Where	resource	booms	are	
perceived	to	be	permanent,	they	argue,	political	elites	will	be	less	interested	in	short-term	rent	maximi-
sation	because	permanent	booms	increase	the	likelihood	that	they	will	stay	in	power	and	hence	the	gains	
that	they	can	make	by	promoting	long-term	economic	development.	However,	even	when	booms	are	per-
ceived	to	be	permanent,	economic	outcomes	are	likely	to	be	negative	because	political	elites	will	still	have	
an	incentive	to	engage	in	inefficient	redistribution	of	economic	resources	in	order	to	influence	elections.	
3.3.2.	 Corruption
Corruption	can	be	defined	as	the	abuse	of	public	office	for	private	gain	(Vicente,	2010:	29,	note 2).	How-
ever,	corruption	is	a	complex	and	controversial	area.	Mbaku	(1992:	253)	states	that	corruption	evolves	
from	‘the	clash	between	traditional	values	and	foreign	norms’.	It	has	been	argued	by	Apter	(1963)	and	
Alam	(1989)	that	in	Africa,	bureaucrats	are	under	an	obligation	to	share	the	benefits	of	their	office	with	
their	kin,	a	characteristic	common	to	many	other	societies.	Additionally,	the	criteria	to	determine	whether	
public	authority	has	been	misused	are	debatable	(Bayley,	1966;	Alam,	1989;	Gillespie/	Okruhlik,	1991).	
However,	such	issues	are	far	from	clear-cut.	An	important	aspect	to	consider	is	the	final	use	of	the	rewards	
of	corruption	and	rent-seeking.	The	overall	outcome	will	be	very	different	if	they	are	used	for	productive	
investment	within	the	economy,	than	for	private	consumption	(Sampson,	1975;	Yergin,	1991).
Natural	resources	are	often	associated	with	high	levels	of	corruption.	Empirically	several	studies	have	
shown	that	the	proportion	of	exports	of	fuel,	minerals,	plantation	crops,	and	metals	increases	corrup-
tion	(Treisman,	2000;	Isham	et	al.,	2005;	Aslaksen,	2007).	In	the	context	of	the	Caspian	region,	how-
ever,	Auty	(2001d)	claims	that	levels	of	corruption	do	not	vary	between	the	hydrocarbon-rich	and	hydro-
carbon-poor	countries.	In	similar	vein,	Pleines	(forthcoming)	indicates	that	the	oil	boom	has	not	led	to	
any	significant	rise	in	general	corruption	in	Azerbaijan,	Kazakhstan	and	Turkmenistan,	and	that	cor-
ruption	especially	in	the	oil	and	gas	industry	in	these	countries	takes	first	of	all	the	forms	of	grand	theft	
and	commercial	corruption	due	to	strong	authoritarian	control	of	the	oil	and	gas	sector	by	the	ruling	
elites.	As	a	result,	incidents	of	corruption	in	the	sector	are	fewer	and	less	visible	than	in	the	rest	of	the	
economy,	though	the	sums	involved	are	much	higher.
Vicente	(2010)	analyses	the	effects	of	an	oil	discovery	announcement	on	corruption	at	the	example	of	
Sao	Tome	and	Principe.	In	line	with	Robinson	et	al.	(2006),	the	author	hypothesizes	that	the	discov-
ery	announcement	increases	the	value	to	politicians	to	holding	public	office	while	simultaneously	pro-
vides	them	with	more	resources.	These	resources	can	be	spent	on	improving	the	likelihood	of	(re-)elec-
tion	success	and	on	resource	misallocation	(by	buying	political	support	for	instance)	in	the	rest	of	the	
economy	(Vicente,	2010:	29).
Misallocation	means	a	shift	of	resources	towards	the	higher	valued	‘political’	allocations	resulting	in	an	
increased	relative	scarcity	of	resources	in	‘non-political’	sectors	(such	as	the	ones	relating	to	standard	
public	services).	Higher	competition	in	‘non-political’	allocations	could	then	lead	to	increased	corrup-
tion	in	these	sectors	(Vicente,	2010:	31).
Already	after	(the	announcement	of)	the	Sao	Tomean	oil	discovery,	Vicente	(2010)	finds	clear	increases	
on	perceived	corruption	in	a	number	of	public	services	and	allocations,	most	solidly	in	the	areas	of	vote	
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buying,	education	(as	the	country’s	elite	sees	scholarships	as	more	valuable,	since	they	may	enable	future	
access	to	the	state’s	natural	riches),	and	customs	(as	the	elite	imports	non-food	consumption	goods).
‘We	interpret	these	results	as	indicative	of	increased	competitiveness	for	state	resources,	namely	
those	that	are	accessible	through	the	political	channel.	The	effect	on	vote	buying	points	squarely	
in	this	direction,	but	the	effect	on	higher	education	can	also	be	interpreted	in	this	vein,	given	the	
prominent	social	status	of	scholarships	for	studying	abroad.	The	effect	on	corruption	in	customs	
may	be	a	symptom	of	increased	private	consumption	by	the	Sao	Tomean	elite	(potentially	funded	
with	oil-related	moneys)’	(Vicente,	2010:	29).
However,	it	still	remains	a	puzzle	why	some	resource-rich	countries	(for	example	Australia,	Canada,	
Norway)	have	very	low	levels	of	corruption.	One	main	argument	put	forward	was	that	resource	rents	
(but	also	rents	induced	by	a	lack	of	market	competition)	foster	bureaucratic	corruption	(Ades/	Di	Tella,	
1999).	Bhattacharyya/	Hodler	(2010)	argue	that	strong	democratic	institutions	help	to	moderate	the	
effect	of	natural	resources	on	corruption.	
Bhattacharyya/	Hodler	present	a	political	economy	model	to	illustrate	how	democracy	might	affect	the	
relationship	between	resource	rents	and	corruption	by	constructing	a	game	between	politicians	and	the	
people.	They	assume	that	there	are	some	‘good’	politicians	who	act	in	the	people’s	best	interest	and	pos-
sibly	many	more	‘bad’	politicians	who	primarily	care	about	the	revenues	they	can	generate	by	corrupt	
activities.	The	majority	of	people	prefer	to	have	a	good	politician	as	their	leader.	This	provides	an	incen-
tive	for	a	bad	incumbent	to	mimic	a	good	leader	and	not	to	engage	in	corruption	in	order	to	maximise	
his	chances	of	remaining	in	power.	A	bad	incumbent	would	mimic	a	good	leader	if	the	democratic	insti-
tutions	are	sufficiently	sound,	i.e.,	if	popular	support	significantly	improves	his	probability	of	staying	in	
office.	If	this	difference	is	small,	a	bad	incumbent	engages	in	corrupt	activities.	The	level	of	corruption	
increases	with	the	level	of	natural	resource	rents.	Bhattacharyya/	Hodler	conclude	that	resource	abun-
dance	increases	corruption	in	countries	with	poor	democratic	 institutions	but	not	in	countries	with	
comparatively	better	democratic	institutions.25
Such	institutional	changes	would	include	both	electoral	and	judicial	reforms.	Promoting	citizens’	right	
to	information	through	legislation,	increasing	community	participation,	and	social	auditing	of	bureau-
crats	can	also	be	important	tools	towards	building	a	more	accountable	government.	Even	though	far	
from	conclusive,	some	country	studies	are	already	showing	corruption-reducing	effects	of	such	policy	
changes	(Olken,	2007;	Bhattacharyya/	Jha,	2009;	on	international	anti-corruption	standards	see	Low	
et	al.,	2010).
25  In a similar vein as Smith (2004), these findings imply that countries discovering natural resources after they 
have established well-functioning democratic institutions that keep governments accountable tend to handle the 
scourge of corruption much better.

4.	 The	Challenge	of	Political	Stability
The	resource	boom	literature	also	contains	a	number	of	studies	that	suggest	that	natural	resource	abun-
dance	is	associated	with	growing	authoritarianism	(i.e.,	lack	of	democracy)	and	an	increased	(in)sta-
bility	of	these	authoritarian	regimes	(cf.	e.g.,	Ross,	2001b,	2006;	Sala-i-Martin/	Subramanian,	2003;	
Smith,	2004;	Isham	et	al.,	2005).	
Wantchekon	(2002),	for	instance,	found	that	resource-rich	countries	were	more	likely	to	experience	
failed	or	slow	transitions	to	democracy.	Jensen/	Wantchekon	(2004)	presented	similar	findings	con-
cluding	that	resource-abundant	countries	in	Africa	were	more	likely	to	be	authoritarian	and	experience	
breakdowns	in	democracy	after	the	democratic	transition.	Collier/	Hoeffler	(2009a:	294)	conclude	
that	resource-rich	countries	are	systematically	less	democratic	than	resource-poor	countries.	However,	
Karl	(1997)	points	out	that	Venezuela	had	already	been	authoritarian	when	oil	was	developed,	and	in	
fact	transitioned	to	democracy	at	the	height	of	its	oil	wealth.	Haber/	Menaldo	(2011),	looking	for	a	link	
between	democracy	and	the	share	of	oil	or	minerals	in	the	economy,	fail	to	find	statistically	significant	
evidence	(see	also	Feil,	2010).	Similarly,	Dunning	(2008)	finds	that	the	correlation	between	oil	profits	
and	democracy	turns	positive	after	taking	into	account	country-specific	differences	within	Latin	America.
Earlier	research	has	predicted	that	resource-rich	countries	would	suffer	from	political	instability	in	times	
of	decreasing	resource	revenues	(cf.	e.g.,	Beblawi/	Luciani,	1987;	Karl,	1997).	
‘The	“oil-as-spoils”	thesis	maintains	that	the	presence	of	oil	revenues	or	other	extracted	natu-
ral	resources	in	a	country	cause	political	instability	by	(1) presenting	an	attractive	set	of	spoils	to	
potential	rebels	or	state-breakers	and/or	(2) by	creating	resentment	over	unequal	distribution	of	
oil	rents	that	can	spill	over	into	conflict	over	the	pattern	of	distribution’	(Smith,	2004:	234;	see	
also	Okruhlik,	1999;	Watchekon,	1999).	
However,	more	recent	research	has	indicated	the	opposite:	Smith	(2004,	2007)	and	Ulfelder	(2007),	
for	instance,	generally	find	that	authoritarian	regimes	have	lasted	longer	in	countries	with	oil	wealth.	
In	any	case,	in	resource-rich	countries	specific	challenges	for	the	political	elites	arise	regarding	the	sta-
bility	or	instability	(i.e.,	state	weakness)	of	their	regimes.	Challenges	for	the	stability	of	a	regime	include	
the	(1) demands	of	the	populace	(as	unsatisfied	demands	might	lead	to	social	unrest),	(2) elite	power	
struggles	that	might	endanger	the	position	of	the	elite	in	power	(i.e.,	the	evolution	of	a	counter-elite)	
and	(3) civil	war	(as	a	possible	escalation	of	elite	power	struggles	or	social	unrest).
4.1.	 Demands	of	the	Populace/	Social	Unrest
Numerous	scholars	have	linked	problems	of	regime	instability	with	so-called	‘rentier’	states.	In	politi-
cal	science,	the	term	‘rentier	state’	is	used	to	classify	those	states	in	which	the	government	derives	all	or	
a	substantial	portion	of	its	national	revenues	from	the	rent	of	indigenous	resources	to	external	clients.	
The	term	is	most	frequently	applied	to	states	rich	in	highly	valued	natural	resources.	This	‘unearned’	
income	has	often	the	form	of	taxes	on	natural	resource	exports	or	royalties	on	natural	resource	pro-
duction	(Mahdavy,	1970;	Skocpol,	1982;	Beblawi,	1987;	Luciani,	1987;	Gunn,	1993;	Chaudhry,	1994;	
Vandewalle,	1998).
Beblawi	(1987:	51–52,	1990:	87–88)	suggested	four	characteristics	of	a	rentier	state:
1.	 ‘First,	there	is	no	such	thing	as	a	pure	rentier	economy.	Each	and	every	economy	has	some	ele-
ments	of	rent.	A	rentier	economy	should	be	defined	as	one	where	rent	situations	predominate.	
This	of	course	is	a	matter	of	judgment’	(Beblawi,	1987:	51).
2.	 A	rentier	economy	relies	on	a	substantial	external	rent	and	therefore	does	not	require	a	strong	
domestic	productive	sector.
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3.	 ‘Third,	in	a	rentier	state	[italic	in	the	original,	AH]—as	a	special	case	of	a	rentier	economy—only	
few	are	engaged	in	the	generation	of	this	rent	(wealth),	the	majority	being	only	involved	in	the	
distribution	or	utilisation	of	it’	(Beblawi,	1987:	51).
4.	 ‘[…]	in	a	rentier	state	the	government	[italics	in	the	original,	AH]	is	the	principal	recipient	of	the	
external	rent	in	the	economy.	This	is	a	fact	of	paramount	importance,	cutting	across	the	whole	of	
the	social	fabric	of	the	economy	affecting	the	role	of	the	state	in	the	society’	(Beblawi,	1987:	52).
While	rentier	states	receive	substantial	external	rents,	they	are	characterized	by	the	relative	absence	of	
revenue	from	domestic	sources,	as	their	naturally	occurring	wealth	precludes	the	need	to	extract	income	
from	their	citizenry.	Beblawi	(1987:	52)	has	argued	that	this	could	create	a	‘rentier	mentality’;	the	eco-
nomic	behaviour	of	a	rentier	state	‘embodies	a	break	in	the	work-reward	causation	[…].	Rewards	of	income	
and	wealth	for	the	rentier	do	not	come	as	the	result	of	work	but	rather	are	the	result	of	chance	or	situation.’
Due	to	the	large	amounts	of	revenues	at	their	disposal,	it	is	argued	that	rentier	states	tend	to	develop	
greater	capacity	in	distributive	functions	(such	as	social	welfare,	education,	and	health)	than	in	func-
tions	related	to	the	regulation	and	supervision	of	the	economy	and	domestic	taxation	(Garaibeh,	1987;	
Luciani,	1987;	Chaudhry,	1994;	see	also	Karl,	1997;	Moore,	2000,	2004;	Auty/	Gelb,	2001).	
Much	discussion	revolves	around	the	nature	of	society	in	such	states	(Mahdavi,	1970;	Beblawi/	Luciani,	
1987;	Boon,	1990;	Shambayati,	1994;	Okruhlik,	1999).	Due	to	the	large	amounts	of	revenues	at	their	dis-
posal,	it	is	argued,	that	rentier	states	tend	to	develop	greater	capacity	in	distributive	functions	(such	as	
social	welfare,	education,	and	health)	than	in	functions	related	to	the	regulation	and	supervision	of	the	
economy	and	domestic	taxation	(Garaibeh,	1987;	Luciani,	1987;	Chaudhry,	1994;	in	a	similar	vein	but	
with	slightly	different	terminology	and	concepts	Karl,	1997;	Moore,	2000,	2004;	Auty,	2001c,	2001d;	
Auty/	Gelb,	2001).	Smith	(2004:	233)	points	out	that	as	revenues	from	natural	resources	increase	to	
the	point	at	which	they	dominate	a	government’s	budget,	the	government	evolves	from	an	extractive	
state	into	a	distributive	one:	‘the	bulk	of	the	internal	activities	of	the	state	are	concerned	with	distribu-
tion’	(Delacroix,	1980:	18).	
Karl	(1997:	16)	has	argued	that	dependence	on	oil	revenues	leads	to	the	emergence	of	‘petro-states’	which	
are	defined	as	states	that	are	preoccupied	with	the	‘political	distribution	of	rents’	rather	than	promotion	
of	private	investment,	production	and	economic	growth.	The	emergence	of	petro-states,	she	suggests,	is	
particularly	likely	where	the	oil	boom	coincides	with	the	process	of	state	formation	and	institution	build-
ing	(see	also	Vandewalle,	1998:	33–38).	In	these	cases,	the	domination	of	oil	gives	the	state	a	distribu-
tive	character	from	its	inception	by	structuring	domestic	political	institutions,	which	become	locked	in.
The	rentier	state	theory	suggests	that	natural	resource	wealth	prevents	instability	(at	least	in	times	of	
resource	booms)	because	governments	in	resource-rich	countries	are	able	to	use	(1) government	spend-
ing	programmes	and	(2) low	private	taxation	to	reduce	pressures	from	their	populace.	As	Shambayati	
(1994)	has	shown	low	taxes	and	generous	welfare	programmes	discourage	opposition	groups	from	mobi-
lizing	(at	least)	around	economic	issues.
(1) Allocation	policies	tend	to	consolidate	system	stability	and	foster	a	perception	that	some	policies	
benefit	everyone	countering	a	possible	disenfranchise	of	some	societal	groups	(Luciani,	1990:	76).	In	
general,	a	steady	inflow	of	rents	allows	governments	to	offer	general	benefits	to	society	as	well	as	selec-
tive	benefits	to	certain	strategic	social	segments—consistent	with	Olson’s	(1982)	theory	of	 interest	
groups—as	a	means	of	solidifying	the	state’s	role	as	the	central	political	actor	and	allocator	of	resources.	
By	dispensing	patronage	to	key	societal	actors,	the	rentier	state	reinforces	and	legitimizes	its	central	role	
(Cooley,	2001:	166).	The	government	essentially	‘bribes’	the	citizenry	with	extensive	social	welfare	pro-
grams	and	buys	off	political	opponents	(Acemoglu	et	al.,	2004).
Moreover,	because	control	of	the	rent-producing	resources	is	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	the	state,	it	
may	be	used	to	alternately	coerce	or	co-opt	their	populace,	while	the	distinction	between	public	service	
and	private	interest	becomes	increasingly	blurred	(cf.	e.g.,	Beblawi,	1990).	Lam/	Wantchekon	(2003),	
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for	instance,	have	argued	that	the	economic	benefits	of	resource	booms	are	typically	concentrated	on	
political	elites,	in	turn	enabling	them	to	maintain	support	and	consolidate	their	power.	
Representative	bodies	that	do	exist	in	rentier	states	tend	to	be	symbolic,	as	real	political	decisions	are	
made	within	the	bureaucracy,	and	are	seldom	used	as	forums	through	which	policy	differences	are	
mediated	or	addressed	(Cooley,	2001:	166;	see	also	Gause,	1994;	Yates,	1996).	In	authoritarian	politi-
cal	systems,	this	means	more	limited	scope	for	democratic	change.	Similar	arguments	have	been	made	
by	Beblawi	(1987),	Luciani	(1987),	Ross	(2001b)	and	Jensen/	Wantchekon	(2004).
It	is	argued	that	natural	resource	wealth	enables	governments	in	resource-rich	countries	to	spend	more	
on	internal	security	which governments	can	use	to	limit	the	scope	for	political	opponents	to	organise	and	
challenge	them	(cf.	e.g.,	Skocpol,	1982;	Gause,	1995;	Ross,	2001a;	Jensen/	Wantchekon,	2004).	More	
recently,	using	a	direct	measure	of	repression	of	dissent,	De	Soysa/	Malmin	Binningsbø	(2009)	find	ample	
evidence	to	suggest	that	energy	and	mineral	wealth	strongly	predict	higher	levels	of	political	terror.26
‘This	line	of	argument	suggests	that	oil-dependent	regimes	should	evince	significantly	greater	levels	of	
stability	during	pre-boom	and	boom	periods’,	while	a	bust	period	should	be	characterized	by	instability	
(Smith,	2004:	233).	During	boom	periods,	the	state	is	able	to	placate	important	social	groups	by	paying	
them	off	with	resource	revenues	as	well	as	to	enact	interventionist	policies	in	the	economy	and	to	forge	
and	consolidate	patrimonial	political	institutions	(Smith,	2004:	233;	see	also	Crystal,	1990;	Chaudhry,	
1997).	During	bust	periods,	capital	 inflows	substantially	decrease	making	it	 impossible	to	continue	
patronage	while	the	weakness	of	state	institutions	makes	it	impossible	to	extract	revenues	from	domes-
tic	sources.	The	pressure	to	adjust,	in	turn,	initiates	struggles	between	the	state	and	its	societal	constit-
uents	who	are	politically	entrenched	and	reluctant	to	curtail	their	demands	and	expectations	(Cooley,	
2001:	167;	Smith,	2004:	233).
(2) Additionally,	it	is	argued	by	Zakaria	(2004)	and	Collier	(2006)	that	the	absence	of	taxes	reduces	the	
citizens’	incentive	to	hold	the	government	accountable	and	to	place	pressure	on	it	to	become	responsive	
to	their	needs.	Auty/	Gelb	(2001:	128–129)	have	argued	that	the	existence	of	natural	resource	rents	cre-
ates	a	relatively	high	tolerance	by	the	poor	majority	for	inequitable	asset	distribution	and	predatory	rent	
extraction,	in	turn	decreasing	the	chances	for	an	asset	redistribution	by	the	state.	
However,	the	role	of	social	forces	in	shaping	development	outcomes	in	resource	abundant	countries	is	
not	adequately	addressed.	This	is	due	to	the	basic	assumptions	that	political	elites	in	resource-abundant	
countries	have	a	high	degree	of	autonomy	from	domestic	social	groups,	the	role	of	these	social	forces	in	
shaping	development	outcomes	is	not	adequately	addressed.	It	is	assumed	that	political	elites	(as	repre-
sentatives	of	the	state)	are	financially	independent	of	the	citizenry;	thus,	resource-rich	states	are	granted	
immunity	from	social	pressure	(cf.	e.g.,	Auty,	2001c,	2001d).	
However,	Okruhlik	(1999)	argues	that	windfall	profits	of	petroleum	exports	do	not	translate	into	a	
politically	quiescent	population.	While	political	elites	in	resource-abundant	countries	may	rarely	face	
social	pressure	in	relation	to	their	taxation	policies,	they	frequently	face	serious	social	pressures	in	rela-
tion	to	spending	decisions.	She	emphasizes	explicit	linkages	between	state	strategies	of	expenditure	and	
the	political	consequences	for	particular	social	groups.	Furthermore,	the	nature	of	state	institutions	in	
resource-rich	countries	is	often	shaped	by	long-standing	social	patterns	and	dynamics,	particularly	in	
cases	where	natural	resource	domination	of	the	economy	occurred	after	the	state	was	already	formed	
(for	the	example	of	Iran	see	Skocpol,	1982;	Shambayati,	1994).	
Natural	resource	abundance,	particularly	an	abundance	of	point-source	resources,	might	undermine	
social	cohesion	and	in	turn	limit	the	capacity	of	governments	to	manage	economic	shocks.	Ownership	
of	point-source	resources	is	typically	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	a	few	well-connected	individuals	or	
families,	a	situation	that	creates	severe	social	tensions;	this	contradicts	the	argument	of	a	relative	high	
tolerance	for	inequality	among	the	populace	(Auty/	Gelb,	2001).	While	these	tensions	may	be	masked	
26  However, Smith (2004) argues that repression does not account for regime stability in resource-rich countries 
(see also Section 4.2).
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during	periods	of	economic	prosperity	they	come	to	the	surface	at	times	of	economic	crisis	(Isham	et al.,	
2005;	see	also	Rodrik,	1999;	Hausmann,	2003).	This	aspect	will	be	examined	in	more	detail	in	the	fol-
lowing	section	on	socio-economic	development.
Rosser	(2006:	21)	stresses	the	need	to	give	greater	attention	to	the	nature	of	the	social	contexts	 in	
resource-abundant	countries	in	order	to	extract	causal	mechanisms	to	explain	why	these	states	perform	
poorly	in	economic	terms,	are	undemocratic,	and	are	prone	to	violence.
4.2.	 Elite	Power	Struggles
Robinson	et	al.	(2006)	and	Vicente	(2010)	show	that	resource	booms	raise	the	value	of	being	in	power	
while	simultaneously	providing	the	ruling	elite	with	more	resources	to	entrench	their	position.	Coun-
tries	with	large	amounts	of	natural	resources	experience	power	struggles	in	the	sense	that	potential	chal-
lengers	have	a	stronger	incentive	to	seek	to	replace	the	existing	government	(i.e.,	struggle	to	access	and	
control	rents;	rent	competition)	(Caselli,	2006;	see	also	Tornell/	Lane,	1999;	Hodler,	2006;	for	empiri-
cal	evidence	from	Kazakhstan	and	Azerbaijan	see	Umbetaliyeva/	Satpayev,	forthcoming;	Kusznir,	forth-
coming;	Guliyev,	forthcoming;	Meissner,	forthcoming).	
To	increase	the	stability	of	the	existing	regime,	the	elite	in	power	can	react	to	this	challenge	by	(1) cre-
ating	a	patronage	network	to	stabilize	and	legitimize	the	regime	and/or	(2) using	authoritarian	repres-
sion	to	quell	any	opposition.
(1) Spending	large	sums	of	money	on	sustaining	patronage	networks	to	garner	political	support	becomes	
an	entrenched	behaviour	of	governments	in	resource-rich	countries	which	are	reluctant	to	remove	the	
subsidies/	benefits	against	the	will	of	these	interest	groups	(cf.	e.g.,	Anderson,	1987;	Chaudhry,	1989;	
Karl,	1997).	By	dispensing	patronage	to	key	societal	actors,	the	rentier	state	reinforces	and	legitimizes	its	
central	role	(Cooley,	2001:	166).	Abundant	natural	resources	provide	the	ruling	elite	with	the	resources	
to	buy	off	political	opponents	(Acemoglu	et	al.,	2004).
(2) During	bust	periods,	however,	capital	inflows	substantially	decrease	making	it	impossible	to	continue	
patronage.	The	pressure	to	adjust,	in	turn,	initiates	struggles	between	the	state	and	its	societal	constit-
uents	who	are	politically	entrenched	and	reluctant	to	curtail	their	demands	and	expectations	(Cooley,	
2001:	167;	Smith,	2004:	233).	If	political	opponents	cannot	be	bought	off	anymore	and	patronage-based	
loyalty	vanishes,	natural	resource	wealth	enables	governments	to	use	internal	security	mechanisms	
(installed	during	boom	times)	in	order	to limit	the	scope	for	these	opponents	to	organise	and	challenge	
them	(cf.	e.g.,	Skocpol,	1982;	Gause,	1995;	Ross,	2001a;	Jensen/	Wantchekon,	2004).	De	Soysa/	Malmin	
Binningsbø	(2009)	argue	that	energy	and	mineral	wealth	strongly	predict	higher	levels	of	political	terror.
However,	Smith	(2004)	argues	that	repression	does	not	account	for	regime	stability	in	resource-rich	
countries	(his	study	focuses	on	oil-rich	countries).	 ‘[…]	repression	does	not	account	for	the	result,	
suggests	that	there	is	more	to	the	durability	of	regimes	in	oil-rich	states	than	patronage	and	coercion’	
(Smith,	2004:	242).	These	results	are	somewhat	qualified	by	Basedau/	Lay	(2009):	they	argue	that	only	
the	availability	of	very	high	per	capita	revenues	from	oil	allows	governments	to	achieve	internal	stabil-
ity.	They	find	that	oil-wealthy	countries	apparently	manage	to	maintain	political	stability	by	a	combi-
nation	of	large-scale	distribution,	high	spending	on	the	security	apparatus	and	protection	by	outsiders.
4.3.	 Civil	War
The	literature	also	contains	numerous	studies	that	suggest	that	resource-abundant	countries	are	assumed	
to	suffer	a	greater	probability	of	violent	civil	conflicts	and	that	the	resource	endowment	influences	four	
dimension	of	civil	war:	the	onset,	duration,	intensity	(that	is,	the	number	of	battle-related	deaths)	and	
the	type	of	these	conflicts	(cf.	e.g.,	Sachs/	Warner,	1997;	Collier/	Hoeffler,	1998,	2004,	2005;	Doyle/	
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Sambanis,	2000;	Ross,	2001;	Reynal-Querol,	2002;	Fearon/	Laitin,	2003;	Humphreys,	2005;	Collier,	
2007;	Fjelde/	De	Soysa,	2009;	Schollaert/	Van	de	Gaer,	2009;	Lujala,	2009;	Gurses/	Mason,	2010).
Violent	civil	conflicts	might	arise	out	of	social	unrest	and	elite	power	struggles	(see	Sections	4.1	and	4.2).	
In	addition	to	the	possible	reasons	for	instability	mentioned	there,	the	wider	debate	over	the	causes	of	
civil	war	has	centred	around	two	main	arguments:	(1) grievances	and	(2) greed	(Rosser,	2006:	17–18).27	
(1) The	first	argument	has	suggested	that	civil	wars	are	caused	by	grievances	stemming	from	inequal-
ities	of	wealth,	 limited	political	rights,	or	ethnic	and	religious	divisions.	Emphasising	the	motives	of	
rebel	movements,	natural	resource	abundance	serves	to	exacerbate	the	grievances	that	lead	to	rebellion.	
Grievances	stemming	from	various	typical	consequences	of	natural	resource	exploitation	might	include	
insufficiently	compensated	land	expropriation,	environmental	degradation,	inadequate	job	opportuni-
ties,	and	labour	migration.
(2) The	second	argument	assumes	that	rebellions	are	caused	by	greed	emphasising	the	economic	incen-
tives	and	opportunities	for	rebel	organisations	to	enrich	themselves	(Ross,	2002).	At	the	same	time,	how-
ever,	it	suggests	that	civil	wars	are	most	likely	where	natural	resource	abundance	create	opportunities	for	
rebels	to	fund	their	activities	(Collier/	Hoeffler,	2004).	In	this	argument,	natural	resource	abundance	
constitutes	a	potential	source	of	funding	for	rebel	activities	(Collier/	Hoeffler,	2000;	Humphreys,	2005	
calls	that	the	‘feasibility	mechanism’;	also	‘booty	futures’).	It	is	argued	that	the	existence	of	primary	com-
modities	would	enable	rebel	groups	to	raise	money	by	extracting	and	selling	resources	directly	or	extort-
ing	money	from	those	who	do.	This	is	often	referred	to	as	the	‘looting’	mechanism	(Ross,	2004b:	40).	
A	number	of	scholars	have	argued	that	neither	the	grievance	nor	greed	arguments	are	particularly	help-
ful	in	understanding	the	onset	of	civil	war	in	specific	cases,	at	least	not	if	they	are	used	on	their	own.	
Ballentine	(2003)	suggests	that	civil	wars	in	resource-abundant	countries	are	caused,	to	varying	degrees,	
by	some	combination	of	greed	and	grievance,	rather	than	just	one	or	the	other.	In	a	similar	study	of	13	
civil	wars	that	occurred	in	resource-abundant	countries,	Ross	(2004b)	found	even	less	support	for	the	
greed	and	grievance	hypotheses.	He	did,	however,	find	some	support	for	the	notion	that	natural	resource-
related	grievances	can	cause	separatist	civil	wars,	an	effect	he	labels	the	‘separatist’	mechanism. Ross	
(2004b:	57–58)	suggests	that	rather	than	being	caused	by	the	greed	or	grievance	mechanisms,	civil	
wars	in	resource-abundant	countries	are	typically	caused	by	various	alternative	mechanisms	(such	as	
the	‘foreign	intervention’	mechanism	by	increased	probability	of	foreign	intervention	to	support	a	rebel	
movement	and	the	‘booty	futures’	mechanism	enables	rebel	groups	to	sell	future	exploitation	rights	to	
minerals	they	hope	to	capture).	At	the	same	time,	Ross	also	suggests	that	civil	wars	generally	reflect	the	
operation	of	two	or	more	causal	mechanisms	operating	at	once	rather	than	a	single	causal	mechanism.	
Collier/	Hoeffler	(1998,	2004)	found	that	natural	resource	abundance	is	a	strong	and	significant	determi-
nant	of	the	onset	of	civil	war,	although	they	also	found	that	after	a	certain	level	of	abundance,	it	reduced	
this	risk	(i.e.,	curvilinear	relationship).	However,	Collier/	Hoeffler	(2005)	qualify	their	earlier	finding:	
the	rent-based	measure	of	natural	resource	abundance	becomes	insignificant	when	the	original	export-
based	measure	of	natural	resource	wealth	is	included	in	the	regression	analysis	as	well.
Examining	the	effect	of	natural	resource	abundance	on	different	types	of	civil	wars,	Collier/	Hoeffler	
(2002)	find	that	natural	resources	increase	the	risk	of	both	secessionist	and	non-secessionist	civil	wars.	
In	a	similar	study,	Reynal-Querol	(2002)	examined	the	association	between	natural	resources	and	the	
onset	of	ethnic	and	non-ethnic	civil	wars:	while	natural	resource	abundance	is	an	important	variable	
in	explaining	the	incidence	of	non-ethnic	civil	wars	and	other	forms	of	political	violence,	it	is	not	in	the	
case	of	ethnic	civil	wars.	Some	researchers	have	also	suggested	that	natural	resource	abundance	may	
lengthen	the	duration	of	civil	wars	(Collier/	Hoeffler,	1998).	Lujala	(2010)	presents	results	that	support	
the	assertion	that	natural	resources	play	a	central	role	in	armed	civil	conflicts	because	of	the	incentives	
and	opportunities	they	present	for	rebel	groups	resulting	in	prolonged	conflict	duration.
27  Humphreys (2005: 510–513) even distinguishes a total of six rival families of causal mechanisms for civil war in 
resource-rich countries
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Similarly,	Doyle/	Sambanis	(2000)	found	that	natural	resource	wealth	was	significantly	and	negatively	
correlated	with	the	success	of	peace-building	initiatives;	this	finding	suggests	that	natural	resource	wealth	
is	associated	with	longer	wars	(see	also	Ross,	2004a;	Ballantine,	2003).	Fearon	(2004)	found	that	coun-
tries	that	are	rich	in	contraband	resources	such	as	opium,	diamonds,	or	coca	tend	to	experience	longer	
civil	wars.	Regarding	the	intensity	of	civil	wars,	Ross	(2004b)	found	only	very	modest	support	for	this	
idea	that	natural	resources	prolong	civil	wars	(Rosser,	2006:	9–10).
However,	not	all	the	literature	supports	this	view.	Some	scholars	have	produced	evidence	to	suggest	that	
natural	resource	abundance	may	not	have	a	negative	effect	on	the	onset,	duration	or	intensity	of	civil	
war	(cf.	e.g.	Fjelde,	2009;	Shabafrouz,	2010).	In	a	study	of	the	effects	of	oil	dependence	on	regime	failure	
and	conflict,	Smith	(2004),	for	instance,	found	that	oil	wealth	is	associated	with	lower	levels	of	civil	war	
and	anti-state	protest.	Similarly,	Sørli	et	al.	(2005)	found	that	oil	dependence	has	not	exercised	a	signif-
icant	influence	on	the	onset	of	civil	war	in	the	Middle	East	in	recent	decades.	In	respect	of	the	duration	
of	civil	war,	Humphreys	(2005)	suggests	that	natural	resource	conflicts	are	more	likely	to	end	quickly,	
while	Ross	(2003b)	has	presented	evidence	to	suggest	that	while	lootable	resources	may	serve	to	pro-
long	non-separatist	conflicts,	non-lootable	resources	serve	to	reduce	non-separatist	conflicts	(see	also	
Collier	et	al.	2004).	In	respect	of	the	intensity	of	civil	war,	Ballentine	(2003)	has	suggested	that	natu-
ral	resource	abundance	has,	in	some	cases,	reduced	the	number	of	battle-related	deaths	during	civil	war	
(Rosser,	2006:	12).
5.	 Socio-economic	Challenges
More	recently,	research	has	focused	on	the	negative	socio-economic	development	effects	likely	to	be	
associated	with	natural	resource	exploitation	such	as	inequality,	poverty	and	others.	For	instance,	Bulte	
et	al.	(2005)	examine	the	relationship	between	resource	abundance	and	several	indicators	of	human	wel-
fare	concluding	that	resource-rich	countries	tend	to	suffer	lower	levels	of	human	development.	While	
they	find	only	weak	support	for	a	direct	link	between	resources	and	welfare,	there	is	an	indirect	link	
that	operates	through	institutional	quality.	Measuring	social	development	by	a	combination	of	health	
and	education	outcomes,	Carmignani/	Avom	(2010)	find	that	a	higher	dependence	on	primary	com-
modity	exports	is	negative	for	social	development.	The	transmission	mechanism	seems	to	operate	via	
income	inequality	and	macroeconomic	volatility.
Tornell/	Lane	(1999)	provide	a	general	explanation	for	this	phenomenon:	They	assume	that	the	high	value	
of	resource	rents	would	induce	competing	political	groups	to	engage	in	a	redistributive	struggle.	When	
these	groups	are	powerful	and	do	not	coordinate	they	cause	a	‘voracity	effect’.	‘The	“voracity	effect”	is	
a	more-than-proportional	increase	in	discretionary	redistribution	in	response	to	an	increase	in	the	raw	
rate	of	return	in	the	efficient	sector’	(Tornell/	Lane,	1999:	34).	In	other	words,	they	consume	‘too	much’	
because	each	group	attempts	to	grab	a	greater	share	of	national	wealth	by	demanding	more	transfers.	
The	government	in	turn	must	finance	such	transfers	by	levying	higher	taxes	on	the	formal	sector,	the	
only	sector	taxes	can	be	levied	on.	This	is	reflected	in	a	higher	tax	rate	in	the	formal	sector.	As	a	result,	a	
greater	share	of	resources	is	transferred	into	the	informal	sector,	where	it	is	safe	from	taxation.	The	lack	
of	institutional	barriers	to	discretionary	redistribution	results	in	reduced	growth	in	case	of	increased	
windfalls	(Tornell/	Lane,	1999:	23–24,	30).	With	this	voracity	effect,	rents	are	not	merely	wasted	as	
in	conventional	rent-seeking	but	national	income	is	actually	reduced	(Collier/	Hoeffler,	2009:	294).
In	contrast,	according	to	Franke	(2009),	welfare	policy	in	authoritarian	regimes	(such	as	Kazakhstan)	
is	used	as	a	means	by	the	government	in	order	to	ensure	the	populace’s	loyalty	instead	of	a	tool	to	pre-
vent	or	solve	social	problems.	The	main	objective	of	authoritarian	welfare	policy	is	the	maintenance	of	
power	and	control	(see	also	Fajth,	1999;	Müller,	2004;	Cerami,	2006).	The	government	exchanges	social	
welfare	services	for	loyalty;	thus,	especially	members	of	the	bureaucracy	and	military	as	well	as	societal	
stabilizing	forces	such	as	families,	pensioners	and	veterans	have	privileged	access	to	the	welfare	system.	
The	commonly	used	indicators	of	human	welfare	include	(1) inequality/poverty,	(2) health	care	and	
(3) human	resources/education.
(1) Gylfason/	Zoega	(2002)	find	indications	of	 increasing	inequality	 in	resource-rich	countries	(see	
also	Robinson,	2009).	At	the	example	of	Russia,	Buccellato/	Mickiewicz	(2009)	demonstrate	that	the	
regional	oil	and	gas	abundance	is	associated	with	high	within-region	inequality.	They	provide	empiri-
cal	evidence	that	hydrocarbons	represent	one	of	the	leading	determinants	of	an	increased	gap	between	
rich	and	poor	in	the	producer	regions.	Pegg	(2006)	concludes	that	mining	in	general	has	a	dismal	empir-
ical	track	record	in	poverty	reduction.	However,	analysing	the	Bolivian	gas	boom	of	the	1990s,	Lay	et	al.	
(2006)	suggest	that	the	gas	boom	induces	a	combination	of	un-equalising	and	equalising	forces,	which	
tend	to	offset	each	other.	As	net	distributional	change	is	limited,	growth	generated	by	the	boom	reduces	
poverty	despite	increasing	informality.	Similarly,	Caselli/	Michaels	(2009)	find	that	oil	windfalls	contrib-
ute	little	to	local	living	standards	in	Brazil	due	to	increased	instances	of	illegal	activities	of	local	officials.
Studies	on	inequality	also	indicate	an accentuated	rural-urban	disparities	as	natural	resource	rents	typ-
ically	end	up	in	government	coffers	and,	therefore,	are	captured	by	the	urban	ruling	elite;	the	poor	are	
largely	excluded	from	any	benefits	(Davis/	Tilton,	2005:	236;	for	the	example	of	Azerbaijan	see	Baschieri	
et	al.,	2005;	Habibov,	2010).	In	similar	vein,	Isham	et	al.	(2005)	point	out	that	resource-rich	countries	
experience	greater	social	cleavages	in	than	other	countries	because	some	groups	have	greater	access	
to	natural	resource	rents	than	others.	Additionally,	Fum/	Hodler	(2010)	claim	that	natural	resources	
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raise	income	inequality	 in	ethnically	polarized	societies,	but	reduce	income	inequality	 in	ethnically	
homogenous	societies.
(2) Many	resource-rich	developing	countries	fail	to	provide	primary	health	care	or	struggle	to	main-
tain	their	health	care	systems.	Freund	(1986)	describes	the	effects	of	a	severe	economic	crisis	in	Zam-
bia	after	the	decline	of	copper	prices.	This	crisis	has	set	into	motion	various	austerity	measures	which	
made	it	 increasingly	difficult	for	the	government	to	maintain	the	network	of	health	and	other	social	
services	resulting	in	falling	doctor/population	ratio	and	other	health	service	indicators.	Analysing	the	
effects	of	a	resource	boom	on	the	structure	of	health	systems	at	sub-national	levels,	Calain	(2008)	finds	
that	community	health	is	at	the	same	time	marginalised	and	instrumentalised	toward	economic	and	
corporate	interests.	
(3) Studies	linking	natural	resources	to	growth	through	human	capital	lead	to	contradictory	results.	
Bravo-Ortega/	De	Gregorio	(2005)	show	that	higher	levels	of	human	capital	can	offset	any	negative	
effects	of	resource	wealth.	Their	argument	is	related	to	the	linkage	effect	and	learning-by-doing	(see	Sec-
tion 2.1.2).	Matsuyama	(1992)	argues	that	a	downturn	in	manufacturing	could	lead	to	a	fall	in	demand	
for	education.	In	similar	vein,	Birdsall	et	al.	(1997)	found	evidence	that	different	incentives	might	exist	
to	invest	in	education	as	between	resource-abundant	and	resource	deficient	countries.	Gylfason	(2001a)	
shows	that	in	resource-rich	countries,	negative	growth	stems	from	lower	spending	on	education	and	
lower	levels	of	schooling.	Measured	as	public	expenditure	on	education	relative	to	national	 income,	
expected	years	of	schooling	for	girls,	and	gross	secondary-school	enrolment,	natural	resources	appear	
to	crowd	out	human	capital,	thereby	slowing	down	the	pace	of	economic	development.	However,	Stijns	
(2006)	finds	a	positive	correlation	between	natural	resource	rents	per	capita	and	improved	indicators	
of	human	capital	accumulation.
6.	 Conclusion
As	this	review	of	the	literature	has	shown,	resource	booms	are	seen	to	have	a	broad	impact	on	economy,	
society	and	politics	of	the	respective	countries.	After	initial	optimism	that	resource	wealth	would	offer	
an	easy	way	to	development,	empirical	observations	of	resource	countries	have	led	to	the	‘resource	curse’	
paradigm,	which	claims	that	a	resource	boom	is	more	a	problem	than	a	solution.
However,	after	two	decades	of	research	on	the	issue,	there	is	still	no	conclusive	evidence	on	the	effects	
(and	even	less	on	the	causal	mechanisms)	of	the	resource	curse.	In	summary,	several	weaknesses	of	the	
resource	curse	literature	are	identified.
Generally,	most	of	the	literature	(especially	on	the	economic	and	socio-economic	challenges	of	a	resource	
boom)	is	based	on	large-N	studies,	where	conclusions	are	drawn	from	correlations	of	country-level	var-
iables	for	a	large	set	of	countries.	Thus,	most	studies	on	resource	booms	are	highly	deterministic;	they	
do	not	comport	with	the	fact	that	there	is	considerable	variation	in	the	economic	and	development	out-
comes	experienced	by	individual	resource-abundant	countries.	They	also	do	not	comport	with	appar-
ent	variation	in	the	extent	to	which	resource-rich	countries	suffer	from	the	various	political	challenges	
that	are	mediating	the	relationship	between	natural	resource	abundance	and	development	performance	
(Rosser,	2006:	22–23;	exceptions	are	e.g.,	Auty/	Gelb,	2001;	Acemoglu	et	al.,	2003).	Not	all	resource-
rich	countries	have	developed	predatory	or	rentier	states,	nor	have	all	suffered	from	problems	of	corrup-
tion	and	rent-seeking	to	the	same	extent.	
Even	though	country	or	regional	case	studies	do	exist	(cf.	e.g.,	Auty,	1994b,	2001d,	2003,	2004a,	2004b,	
2009;	Ahrend,	2005;	Tompson,	2005;	Kalyuzhnova/	Kaser,	2006;	Kalyuzhnova,	2006;	Brauer,	2007;	
Rosser,	2007;	Banks,	2008;	Najman/	Pomfret,	2008;	Merlevede	et	al.,	2009;	Franke	et	al.,	2009;	
Rwabizambuga,	2009;	Franke	et	al.,	2011),	they	do	not	look	at	the	causal	mechanisms	at	the	micro-level.	
A	major	shortcoming	is	that	existing	explanations	do	not	adequately	account	for	the	role	of	political	and	
social	forces	in	shaping	development	outcomes.	Most	of	the	literature	has	been	too	reductionist	and	has	
not	examined	which	political	and	social	factors	enable	some	resource-rich	countries	to	utilise	their	nat-
ural	resources	to	promote	development	and	prevent	others	from	doing	the	same	(Rosser,	2006:	3,	7–8;	
see	also	Schrank,	2004;	Snyder/	Bhavnani,	2005).
Very	few	analyses	of	resource	booms	have	taken	into	account	the	decision-making	processes	and	the	
connected	conflict	of	 interests	or	political	calculations	of	the	actors	involved	(cf.,	Bayulgen,	2005;	
Maconachie/	Binns,	2007;	Makhmutova,	2007).	Among	these	few,	Jones	Luong/Weinthal	(2010)	focus	
solely	on	the	decision-making	processes	regarding	the	ownership	structures	in	the	energy	sector	in	order	
to	explain	the	resource	challenges.	However,	this	working	paper	argues	that	for	each	policy	area	in	the	
energy	sector	the	political	elite	of	a	resource-rich	country	has	to	make	specific	decisions;	not	every	pol-
icy	outcome	can	be	explained	by	the	ownership	structure	of	the	energy	sector	alone.
In	addition,	the	way	in	which	countries’	external	environments	shape	development	outcomes	in	resource-
abundant	countries	is	not	adequately	addressed.	With	a	few	exceptions	(e.g.,	Ross	2004b),	the	role	of	
external	factors	in	mediating	the	relationship	between	natural	resource	wealth	and	development	out-
comes	has	been	neglected;	development	outcomes	are	generally	seen	as	being	solely	a	product	of	domes-
tic	political	factors.	Rosser	(2006:	22)	indicates	that	the	economic	opportunities	created	by	globaliza-
tion	helped	resource-rich	countries	to	cope	with	the	aftermaths	of	the	1970s	resource	boom.	Inflows	of	
external	capital	in	the	form	of	foreign	aid	and	foreign	direct	investments	(FDI)	during	the	1980s	and	
1990s,	for	example,	helped	Indonesia,	Malaysia	and	Thailand	to	avoid	economic	problems	during	the	
bust	period.	A	country’s	geo-political	and	geo-economic	environment	is	thus	an	important	mediating	
factor	in	the	relationship	between	natural	resource	wealth	and	developmental	performance.
This	working	paper	argues	that	the	negative	consequences	of	a	resource	boom	are	not	a	‘curse’	in	the	sense	
of	an	unavoidable	fate	or	destiny,	but	rather	the	result	of	specific	policy	choices.	Therefore,	inconclusive	
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evidence	on	the	impact	of	resource	booms	is	the	obvious	result,	as	some	countries	manage	the	related	
resource	challenges	(thus	mitigating	or	avoiding	the	negative	impact)	while	others	do	not.	
This	understanding	has	two	implications.	First,	a	change	in	research	strategies	is	needed.	It	is	not	suffi-
cient	to	run	correlations	between	resource	wealth	and	socio-economic	indicators.	Instead	policy	meas-
ures	(in	that	case,	the	states’	responses	to	the	resource	challenges)	have	to	be	included	as	intervening	
variables.	In	order	to	do	so	more	detailed	country	studies	are	needed.
Second,	if	specific	policy	choices	can	help	to	avert	the	‘resource	curse’,	then	the	focus	of	academic	research	
should	be	less	on	the	impact	of	a	resource	boom	as	such,	but	more	on	specific	policy	measures	to	manage	it.
***
In	the	literature	on	the	resource	curse	there	is	growing	consensus	that	institutional	weakness	is	central	
to	the	explanation	of	the	negative	effects	of	resource	booms	(Collier/	Hoeffler,	2009:	294).	The	quality	
of	institutions	is	considered	a	fundamental	factor	that	determines	a	country’s	economic	performance.	
Sound	macroeconomic	or	microeconomic	policies	need	an	institutional	structure	to	support	them	(e.g.,	
Barro,	1991;	North,	1994).	Robinson	et	al.	(2006)	and	Mehlum	et	al.	(2006)	both	stress	the	role	of	insti-
tutions	and	good	governance	to	offset	the	negative	effects	caused	by	resource	rent	extraction	(Collier/	
Hoeffler,	2009:	294;	see	also	Salti,	2008)
Atkinson/	Hamilton	(2003:	1804),	for	instance,	have	argued	that	resource-rich	countries	with	‘good	
quality	institutions’—defined	in	terms	of	the	extent	of	the	rule	of	law,	bureaucratic	quality,	the	level	
of	government	corruption,	and	the	risk	of	investment	expropriation	and	contract	repudiation—have	
achieved	greater	rates	of	investment	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	saving	than	resource-rich	countries	with	
poor	quality	institutions.	
Similarly,	Eifert	et	al.	(2003)	have	emphasised	regime	type.	More	specifically,	they	suggest	that	mature	
democracies	have	performed	better	in	terms	of	managing	oil	rents	than	autocracies	or	factional	democ-
racies	because	their	higher	levels	of	transparency	and	accountability,	 lower	levels	of	corruption,	and	
stronger	protection	of	civil	and	political	rights	have	translated	into	a	higher	capacity	for	long-term	deci-
sion-making	and	more	stable	economic	policies.	
When	good	governance	is	the	solution,	a	resource	boom	might,	indeed,	act	in	the	form	of	a	curse	as	nat-
ural	resource	exports	
‘can	damage	institutions	(including	governance	and	the	legal	system)	indirectly—by	removing	
incentives	to	reform,	improve	infrastructure,	or	even	establish	a	well-functioning	tax	bureauc-
racy—as	well	as	directly—by	provoking	a	fight	to	control	resource	rents.	[…]	There	is	growing	
evidence	that	[this,	AH]	effect	is	the	most	problematic’	(Hartford/	Klein,	2005).	
In	a	similar	vein,	Davis/	Tilton	(2005:	240)	suggest	that	large	resource	rents	‘may	themselves	under-
mine	good	governance	by	breeding	corruption	and	a	decline	of	institutional	quality.’
‘The	debate	therefore	centres	[…]	not	on	the	type	of	governance	needed,	but	on	whether	most	resource-
dependent	developing	countries	can	achieve	the	desired	governance’	(Davis/	Tilton,	2005:	240).
However,	before	discussing	the	ability	of	political	elites	to	achieve	the	desired	governance	quality,	it	is	
important	to	note	that	political	elites	in	many	resource	countries	do	not	seem	to	have	the	wish	to	achieve	
the	kind	of	governance	and	development	outcomes	desired	by	Western	academics.	Mostly	because	it	can	
be	easier	to	acquire	personal	material	gains	without	transparency,	checks	and	balances	or	term	limits	for	
public	office.	But	in	many	cases	political	elites	also	seem	to	consider	authoritarian	control	and	repression	
to	be	more	efficient	regarding	their	entrenchment	in	power	than	election	contests	(cf.	Dunning,	2005).	
Smith	(2004:	238)	states	that	‘regimes	in	oil-rich	states	face	a	lower	risk	of	breakdown	and	confront	
fewer	civil	wars	and	anti-state	protests	than	regimes	in	oil-poor	states’.	While	oil	dependence	is	a	pos-
itive	predictor	of	durability,	at	the	same	time	it	is	negatively	related	to	democracy	(Smith,	2004:	238;	
see	also	Morrison,	2007,	2009).	
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‘[…]	the	persistence	of	authoritarian	regimes	in	oil-rich	states	long	after	the	bust	of	the	1980s—
after	access	to	patronage	rents	had	dropped	off	dramatically—suggests	that	leaders	in	many	of	
these	states	invested	their	windfall	revenues	in	building	state	institutions	and	political	organiza-
tions	that	could	carry	them	through	hard	times’	(Smith,	2004:	232).
‘That	regimes	in	oil-rich	states	(1) tend	to	fare	better	than	others	despite	the	volatility	of	their	rev-
enue	base	and	(2) that	they	even	fared	well	during	the	oil	bust	of	1986	and	beyond	suggests	two	
plausible	mechanisms	of	regime	maintenance	that	belie	the	weak-state	assumptions	associated	
with	oil	wealth.	First,	many	of	these	regimes	may	have	had	robust	social	coalitions	that	went	much	
deeper	than	the	simple	purchase	of	legitimacy.	[…]	Second,	regimes	such	as	these	may	have	built	
institutions	that	could	provide	non-repressive,	as	well	as	repressive,	responses	to	organized	oppo-
sition’	(Smith,	2004:	242–243).
In	the	literature	on	resource	booms,	there	is	no	single	explanation	of	what	creates	a	‘blessing’	rather	
than	a	‘curse’;	nor	is	there	agreement	on	any	collection	of	explanations.	This	argues	for	a	case-by-case	
approach	rather	than	trying	to	force	some	sort	of	generalization.	It	also	adds	support	to	the	suggestion	
to	speak	of	‘resource	challenges’	instead	of	a	‘resource	curse’	and	then	evaluate	the	nature	of	the	differ-
ent	causal	mechanisms	behind	the	challenges	and	country-specific	measures	to	address	them.
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